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ABSTRACT 
Intelligence Fusion Cells (or Fusion Centers) can be an effective means to best 
leverage the capabilities of various organizations and agencies in pursuit of a particular 
mission or objective.  This thesis will examine what characteristics enable three types 
(DoD-led, State and Local Fusion Centers, and DOJ/OGA-led fusion cells) of fusion cells 
to be most effective.  There is no set definition for how to measure “effectiveness” across 
types of fusion cells.  This fact created several research issues which are analyzed and 
discussed at length. 
After examining what makes these fusion cells effective, the authors will explore 
what lessons learned from fusion cells the U.S. government can apply to the federal level 
to improve interagency cooperation and efficacy.  The lessons from a more micro-level 
(fusion cells) can be applied to the more macro-level (interagency cooperation). 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
What makes Fusion Cells (FC) effective? 
Are we lucky or are we good?  Why have there not been any more 9/11s?  A 
partial answer to this question can be found in the FC.  FCs are designed to bring together 
analytical intelligence expertise from multiple agencies and focus their efforts 
specifically on gaining actionable intelligence to kill, capture, or disrupt terrorists and 
their affiliates.  FC performance varies greatly across both time and individual fusion 
cells.  Our research will define what a high-performance FC looks like and identify the 
factors that lead to the successful performance of a FC. 
A thorough understanding of what makes these interagency organizations perform 
has important implications for the overarching United States Government (USG) 
counterterrorism effort.  We believe that interagency FCs are an excellent proxy by which 
to gain insight into a more effective USG counterterrorism effort.  Our findings suggest 
that an FC’s access to decision makers and its decision making process/information flow 
are the two most important variables related to effectiveness.  Additional findings 
indicate that FC agency membership, leadership, and FC member empowerment are also 
important variables related to effectiveness.  We present several micro (FCs) and macro 
level (USG) recommendations on how to improve USG counter-terrorism efforts. 
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I. SETTING THE STAGE 
No terrorist group has successfully attacked the United States homeland since 
September 11, 2001.  Nevertheless, global terrorist attacks have risen from 348 in 2001 to 
14,499 attacks in 2007.1  These statistics show an interesting dynamic concerning the 
United States and terrorism; no attacks on United States soil, yet a more than forty-fold 
increase in attacks worldwide.  Is the fact that there have been no follow-on attacks on 
U.S. soil the result of U.S. foreign policy? A successful governmental structure to defend 
against terrorist attacks? Dumb luck? Or perhaps our  enemies have  made a strategic 
choice not to attack? 
A. BACKGROUND 
 The United States deployed forces to Afghanistan beginning in October 2001 and 
invaded Iraq in May of 2003.  The U.S. government (USG) states that both actions were 
done as part of the U.S. global war on terror post-9/11.  If the U.S. has approximately 
135,000 troops in Iraq (six years after the invasion) and 30,000 troops in Afghanistan 
(almost eight years after the invasion), but terrorist attacks continue to rise worldwide, 
what does this say about the success or failure of the U.S. response to terrorism? 
Post-9/11, the U.S. has had to protect itself against another attack against the 
homeland.  To do this successfully requires a level of synchronization and information 
sharing that has never existed before in the USG.  In an effort to accomplish this, various 
agencies of the USG have created Intelligence Fusion Cells (FC) to better achieve 
counter-terrorism synchronization (note: fusion cell and fusion center are used 
interchangeably throughout this thesis).  
Generally speaking, an FC is an ad-hoc organization manned by intelligence 
analysts from different USG agencies.  The specific agencies present in an FC vary 
                                                 






depending on that FC’s focus (i.e., CONUS vs. OCONUS).  FCs produce intelligence 
products for senior USG decision makers.  For example, a typical OCONUS FC produces 
targeting packages on high-value targets (terrorists) in a given geographical area.  Our 
research question seeks to examine this particular facet of the U.S. response to 
terrorism—specifically, what makes FCs effective? 
We believe that a thorough understanding of what makes these interagency 
organizations work is critical to the overall USG counterterrorism effort.  It is our belief 
that if we continue with the USG counterterrorism efforts of the past eight years, then this 
problem set (radical Islamic terrorism) will continue indefinitely, with more USG failure 
than success.  We believe that FCs can, from an organizational perspective, provide 
critical insight on how to improve the overall USG counterterrorism effort.  
How can the U.S. get back down to 348 worldwide terrorist attacks from 14,499?  
It is our hypothesis that some of the critical answers to this question are found in FCs. 
Potentially, an FC’s flatness, agility, and ability to rapidly distribute and coordinate 
intelligence is a micro-example of a highly efficient model that can be applied at a 
national level to achieve similar effects.  Specifically, we want to explore whether access 
to decision makers, interagency cell membership, level of individual empowerment, 
decision making process, and information flow are critical to the effectiveness of FCs. 
B. THEORY 
Applicable theory for fusion cells is drawn from three primary sources:  (1) USG 
Interagency collaboration, (2) Intelligence Reform literature, and (3) Organizational 
design literature.  Interagency collaboration theory primarily derives from the ongoing 
efforts to reform the National Security structure of the USG.2  Intelligence reform 
literature seeks to address the failure of 9/11 from an intelligence perspective. 
Organizational design theory takes the tact that there are unique design aspects to how 
                                                 
2 Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield, (Project on National Security Reform: 
Arlington, VA, December 2008), downloaded from 




USG interagency efforts function and can be improved upon.  Currently, there is no 
theoretical literature specific to fusion cells.     
Chapter II discusses these sources of literature to construct a framework for 
understanding the origins and functions of FCs.  We will then synthesize this theoretical 
base to identify the five independent variables that we propose to be related to FC 
effectiveness: access to decision makers, cell membership, level of individual 
empowerment, the decision making process/information flow. 
C. INTERAGENCY EFFECTIVENESS 
An FC is an example of a USG interagency collaborative effort.  FCs must 
successfully integrate information from disparate sources and work together to be 
effective.  What is effectiveness and how does one measure it?  These are questions that 
Chapter III tackles and are some of the most difficult to answer for this thesis.  Given the 
variability across FCs, is there a standard that can be applied to define effectiveness?  
Once effectiveness is defined, how then can you measure it?  Our means to capture this 
was to (1) ask each person surveyed to define what effectiveness means for their FC and 
(2) to define how influential their FCs products are in achieving a counter-terrorism end 
state.  Furthermore, we will conduct follow up interviews with FC end users.  The 
answers to these questions are critical to our study.   
This thesis treats FCs as a sub-set of a larger problem; interagency collaboration.  
From personal experience, each of the authors has experienced how the USG interagency 
process functions.  We hope that our study of FCs will shed some light on how the 
interagency can work together more effectively.  Chapter III examines the USG 





We have built upon the survey work of Thomas, Hocevar, and Jansen concerning 
interagency collaboration to develop a survey on Interagency Intelligence Fusion Cells.3  
Thomas et al. sought to measure what factors facilitated or hindered interagency 
collaboration.  From this analysis, they developed a survey they administered to senior 
level managers within the Department of Defense acquisition field and Department of 
Homeland Security.  Using their work as a starting point for our efforts, we developed a 
survey designed to capture how effective FCs are (dependent variable) and what factors 
influenced that effectiveness (independent variables).  
From our experience on FCs and from the literature reviewed, we believe that 
access to decision makers, interagency membership, level of individual empowerment, 
and style of decision making process and internal information flow are critical aspects to 
FC effectiveness.  These independent variables are defined as follows: 
 
1.  Access to decision makers: the relationship the FC has with senior level USG 
personnel who can who can authorize and/or direct action on an FC product.  
 
2.  Interagency membership:  the number of USG agencies that have personnel 
serving on an FC, the experience level of those personnel, and the preparation and 
support given to them from their parent agency.   
 
3.  Level of individual empowerment:  the level of authority a given agency has 
delegated to the individual(s) from that agency serving on an FC.     
 
4.  Decision-making process/Information flow:  the manner in which the FC 
functions internally (hierarchical or collaborative) and the rapidity with which 
                                                 
3A survey methodology and explanation of these factors from an organizational design perspective are 
found in Gail F. Thomas, Susan P. Hocevar, and Erik Jansen, A Diagnostic Approach to Building 




information (intelligence, operational, functional) flows both within the FC and 
between the FC and the larger intelligence community. 
 
5.  Leadership: leaders who enable, encourage, and guide the FC and who 
successfully represent the FC to member agencies and decision makers.   
  
Chapter IV discusses in detail the strengths and shortcomings of our survey.  We 
distributed our survey to over 4,000 individuals from dozens of FCs in both the 
continental United States and overseas.  We personally interviewed 20 individuals 
associated with FCs (FC members, FC leadership, and FC consumers) for background 
information and amplifying data.  We acknowledge and discuss in this chapter issues of 
sample size, characteristics of FCs, measures of effectiveness, time series data issues, 
dependent variable measurement, and survey question bias.  In essence, this chapter 
discusses what steps we took to moderate the flaws inherent with this measurement 
technique.   
Our hypothesis is that the most effective FC’s maximize access to decision 
makers, have the appropriate and necessary interagency members, are empowered (from 
their parent organization), and a collaborative decision-making process with a high 
degree of information flow within and without the FC.  This chapter establishes the 
means by which we sought to prove his hypothesis and define what effectiveness is for 
FCs.  Although survey research has inherent methodological problems, we believe it was 
the best means by which to test our hypothesis due to the nature of our subject, little if 
any previous research and the fluid nature of FC membership.  The chapter’s conclusion 
discusses other potential methods to study FCs for future research. 
E. SURVEY RESULTS 
Chapter V presents the results of our surveys.  We used standard statistical 
techniques (regression analysis and descriptive statistics) to analyze and present the data.  




stronger and weaker aspects of FCs.  We used regression analysis to determine the nature 
of the relationship between our independent (access to decision makers, cell membership, 
level of individual empowerment, and internal decision-making process/information 
flow) and dependent variables (FC effectiveness).  Additionally, we discuss the results 
from our surveys and discuss the demographic background of survey participants.  
Chapter V includes a section discussing several measurement problems and issues with 
our dependent variable (effectiveness) and FCs. 
F. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Chapter VI is split into two sections: micro and macro recommendations.  The 
micro section discusses in detail what lessons are learned from our study that can help 
improve the effectiveness of FCs.  The macro section broadens the scope and present 
what we think are the most important lessons learned from studying FCs that are 
applicable to USG interagency cooperation.  Positive or negative, these results can help 
practitioners in the interagency improve their output.  We hope that the results of this 
thesis can inform participants, leaders, and decision makers throughout the USG and 





II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The question of “what makes fusion cells effective?” is not covered in any detail 
or depth in the available unclassified literature.  The existing applicable theory for 
operation of fusion cells is drawn from three primary sources:  (1) Intelligence reform 
literature, (2) organizational design literature, and (3) publications from U.S. government 
departments or public institutions focused on fusion cells.  This chapter examines what 
defines fusion cells or centers then, building on existing definitions, advance a more 
comprehensive definition.  Following that is a review of the previously mentioned 
primary sources of theory for fusion cell operations and how they apply to this thesis. 
Intelligence reform literature primarily examines the ongoing efforts to reform the 
national security structure of the USG and seeks to address the failures resulting in the 
9/11 attacks from an intelligence perspective.  Organizational design theory provides 
some innovative concepts which can be applied to how fusion cells are organized.  A 
growing body of literature comes from U.S. government departments and public 
institutions, specifically organizations involved with the increasing numbers of State and 
Local Fusion Cells (SLFC) operating throughout the nation.  The various organizations 
that are part of, and work with, the SLFCs have generated numerous conferences, 
articles, and other publications which help provide some theory for operating effective 
fusion cells.  Given that the vast majority of fusion cells are post 9/11 creations, the 
theoretical background on fusion cells is not yet robust nor highly developed.  We 
examine each of these three sources later in this chapter. 
B. DEFINING FUSION CELLS 
The definition of a fusion cell is directly correlated with the perspective of the 
organization providing the definition.  Common threads or phrases found in most 
definitions include: collaboration, two or more agencies, detect, and prevent.  Existing 




exact definition of a fusion cell.  Included below are several of the most representative 
definitions in the literature.  However, the specific definition depends on the 
organization.   
The DHS and DOJ Fusion Center Guidelines from August 2006 offered that a 
fusion center is “a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, 
expertise, and/or information to the center with the goal of maximizing the ability to 
detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.”4  Congress, as 
part of its 2007 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, defined 
fusion centers as: 
A collaborative effort of 2 or more Federal, State, local, or tribal 
government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or information 
with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, 
investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.5  
Department of Defense joint doctrine does not have a formal definition of what a 
fusion cell is.  However, it defines “fusion” as: “In intelligence usage, the process of 
examining all sources of intelligence and information to derive a complete assessment of 
activity.”6  Joint Publication 2-0 goes on to elaborate that:  
Fusion is the process of collecting and examining information from all 
available sources and intelligence disciplines to derive as complete an 
assessment as possible of detected activity.  It draws on the 
complementary strengths of all intelligence disciplines, and relies on an 
all-source approach to intelligence collection and analysis.  
It is interesting to note that the term “fusion center” is marked for deletion in future 
iterations of JP 2-0.7  Instead of removing this term from doctrine, the authors 
recommend that it should be maintained and further developed for the military to utilize. 
                                                 
4 U.S. Department of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and 
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One additional definition for a fusion cell from a thesis on homeland security described it 
as, “A physical location where analysts receive, process, and analyze all-source 
information and synthesize their analysis into intelligence products suitable for 
dissemination to relevant agencies and officials.”8  All of these definitions attempt to 
describe the process in terms (depending on the specific definition) of who, what, where, 
when, and why.   
The various definitions for fusion cells essentially point to the same end state: to 
make the sum (impact) of the fusion cell greater than its individual members would be 
able to accomplish alone.  We offer the following as a definition for fusion cells: a 
physical space wherein two or more organizations combine personnel, resources, and 
information in a synergistic effort designed to aid the mission on a magnitude greater 
than unilateral efforts could provide. 
C. INTELLIGENCE REFORM LITERATURE 
Intelligence reform literature has a lengthy history.  For this thesis, we focused on 
the body of work which arose from the failure of the U.S. intelligence community in the 
9/11 attacks.  As it relates to fusion cells, this literature generally highlights the need for 
fusion cells but does not present specifics.  The most insightful work in this category is 
from Amy Zegart’s An Empirical Analysis of Failed Intelligence Reforms Before 
September 11, which analyzes U.S. intelligence reform efforts post Cold War to the 
present.  She proposes several possible theories (primarily organizational adaption) and 
examines them given the various commission reports and congressional testimony.  She 
concludes that the conditions for the intelligence community to miss the 9/11 attack 
occurred despite the fact that policy makers knew of the threat and of the organizational 
deficiencies in the intelligence community.  These conditions included internal resistance 
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to reform and institutional barriers hindering the fixing of problems with different 
agencies working together to protect America.9 
Two works that  argue for flattened, less hierarchical fusion elements as a way to 
improve information sharing and data flow are Uncertain Shield by Richard Posner and 
Analyzing Intelligence, edited by Roger George and James Bruce.  Posner notes that “In a 
centralized system, sharing follows an inverted-V pattern: crucial information flows up 
the hierarchy to the decision-making level from one agency and down the hierarchy to 
another, creating delay and a risk of losing or garbling vital information.”10   In Analyzing 
Intelligence, Timothy Smith’s chapter adds the idea of “Integrated Project Teams,” which 
require a new, flatter way of doing business to break through “stove-piped chains of 
command with a new system of horizontal integration within and across organizations 
and the community as a whole.”11 
Other sources of intelligence reform literature that  do not have a direct impact on 
this thesis, but may be of use to future research on fusion cells, include: the 9/11 
Commission Report; the resulting Congressional recommendations for implementation; 
and various articles regarding the report that provide some data on the roles of fusion 
cells, legal implications to CONUS fusion cells and their structure.  Likewise, the 
Partnership for National Security Reform (PNSR) publishes works such as Forging A 
New Shield and Turning Ideas Into Action which may present useful ideas for successful 
fusion cells. 12  
Unfortunately, many of the intelligence reform articles cover aspects of fusion 
cells only tangential to our research (such as civil liberty and constitutional issues related 
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to intelligence gathering as it pertains to counter-terrorism).  Nevertheless, intelligence 
reform literature does provide the theoretical explanation for why fusion cells are 
necessary and Chapter III will explore this section of literature further.  
D. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN LITERATURE 
As the organizational design literature relates to fusion cells, one of the key works 
is Henry Mintzberg’s 1980 article “Organizational Design: Fashion or Fit?” In this 
article, Mintzberg discusses the relationship between an organization’s design and its 
overall effectiveness.  Most applicable to the variety of fusion cell structures currently in 
existence is his idea of the “adhocracy” configuration. Mintzberg’s article provides a 
framework to help explain that the wide variety of fusion cell designs is good, provided 
they accomplish their particular assigned mission.13   
Richard Daft’s Organizational Theory and Design contributes the concept of how 
the external environment influences organizations.  Organizations operating in a highly 
unstable and complex environment require extensive “boundary spanning” and many 
integrative roles in the organization.  Daft also highlights the need for what he terms 
“horizontal communication” as uncertainty in the environment increases.  Examples of 
this horizontal communication are improved information systems, task forces, and a full-
time “integrator” to help ensure cross-communication.14  Later in this thesis, we will 
illustrate why these items are critical to fusion cell success. 
Another scholar with worthwhile contributions to our thesis is Charles Perrow.  
He argues that a large organization such as FEMA failed to respond capably to a massive 
disaster—Hurricane Katrina—due to lack of “flexibility and innovation” coupled with 
following a set of rules, which may not have been applicable to the situation.  Perrow’s 
argument helped model our variable of decision making in fusion centers, with a focus on 
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flexible, decentralized decision making.15 Readers who are interested in sociological 
aspects of organizations should consider some of Perrow’s earlier works such as 
Organizational Analysis. 
Other important contributions include Weick and Sutcliffe’s 2001 Managing the 
Unexpected: Assuring High Performance In An Age Of Complexity.  This is a study of 
effectiveness in high-stress organizations where the price of failure can be exceedingly 
high.  Their study looks at “high reliability organizations” (HROs).  These are 
organizations that draw their strength from an inherent ability to maintain reliability in a 
highly complex environment.  Weick and Sutcliffe’s study shows the importance of 
flattened decision making processes in high-stress environments varying from a U.S. 
Navy aircraft carrier to an urban hospital emergency room.  The study focuses on 
environments where life-and-death decisions may need to be made instantly by very 
junior personnel, and how that is encouraged but balanced against maintaining hierarchy 
and order.16  Weick and Sutcliffe illustrate two items that we believe are key to 
successful fusion cells: the importance of flattened decision making and information flow 
while still emphasizing leadership to ensure order and mission accomplishment.  
Organizational design literature, as it relates to Fusion Cells, provides the theoretical 
basis for relating performance to structure.    
E. LITERATURE FROM U.S. GOVERNMENT OR PUBLIC 
ORGANIZATIONS FOCUSED ON FUSION CELLS 
U.S. government publications pertaining to fusion cells generally come from the 
Department of Defense, government agencies teaming with educational institutions, and 
the Department of Homeland Security.  Each of these represent different foci and 
emphasis in their writings related specifically to each organization’s perspective.  
Literature on fusion cell operation is still evolving but is improving and building on 
previous material in both depth and sophistication.   
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A review of applicable Department of Defense (DoD) doctrine (service field 
manuals, Joint Publications), service education and lessons learned references showed an 
almost exclusive focus on service-centric or DoD-centric fusion.  These works do not 
take into account or discuss in any detail other organizations in a fusion cell.  For 
example, Joint Publication (JP) 2-0 contains the joint doctrine for intelligence that 
specifies what the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider requirements for successful 
collaboration.  In the section on Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Intelligence 
Sharing and Cooperation JP 2-0 states, “This type of collaborative intelligence sharing 
environment must be capable of generating and moving intelligence, operational 
information, and orders where needed in the shortest possible time.”17  A JP is not 
designed to dictate operational methodology to individual services and it lacks any 
emphasis on non-DoD organizations.  Unfortunately, so does the U.S. Army’s doctrinal 
manual on counterinsurgency (COIN), FM 3-24.  While the FM has a lot of data points 
on the conduct of COIN operations, it only touches on intelligence fusion for a couple 
paragraphs.  This short section covers in broad terms what “intelligence cells and 
working groups” should contain in terms of membership and what meetings they should 
have.  FM 3-24 notes, “COIN occurs in a joint, interagency, and multinational 
environment at all echelons. Commanders and staffs must coordinate intelligence 
collection and analysis with foreign militaries, foreign and U.S. intelligence services, and 
other organizations.”18  “How” fusion is supposed to occur and best practices are not 
mentioned in FM 3-24. 
Some of the most recent works on fusion cells are from the National Security 
Analysis Department at Johns Hopkins University and the U.S. Joint Forces Command 
(JFCOM).  The Johns Hopkins paper presents useful analysis and ideas from participants 
throughout the intelligence and defense communities during a recently held Interagency 
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Teaming Workshop.19  The JFCOM paper, Application of Tactical Fusion Cell Principles 
at Higher Echelons, details observations made by JFCOM personnel who deployed to 
Iraq to observe DoD-centric fusion cells and collected useful lessons learned from their 
operations.20  Some of the lessons, such as the importance of focusing the fusion cells on 
a singular mission and empowering personnel within fusion cells to solve problems, are 
quite applicable to this thesis.   
Another source of literature, which did not directly impact this thesis, but may be 
of use to future research on fusion cells, comes in the form of introspective analysis, such 
as the DHS Inspector General’s 2008 report titled “DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion 
Centers Is Evolving,” or in the form of external examination and commentary, such as the 
material offered from The Institute for Intergovernmental Research, the Markle 
Foundation, and the various fusion center conferences held each year.21  The Manhattan 
Institute Center for Policing Terrorism’s Policing Terrorism Report contains some very 
useful vignettes and first hand descriptions of lessons learned, such as the September 
2007 edition, which discusses some best practices for State and Local Fusion Centers.”22  
Although limited to the state and local level, these materials are a developing source of 
theory and practice for all fusion cells. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Available literature reviewed for this thesis, and discussed in this chapter, focuses 
on a variety of important topics and concerns for successful operation of fusion cells. 
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Some key data was pulled from this literature and informed and helped develop our 
variables, such as the importance of flattened organizations with solid leadership, 
empowering personnel, cross-communication (transparency), and the value of flexible, 
adhoc elements task organized to accomplish their mission.    However, most of the 
literature focused on items which were not directly applicable to this thesis, such as 
information technology, legal considerations, and internal DoD or DoJ planning 
considerations.  While all those items are important, they miss some very basic elements 
that enable fusion cells to be effective.  In essence, most of the literature reviewed 
presents concepts that are necessary conditions rather than sufficient.  The next chapter 
will examine elaborate on some of the more pertinent literature while exploring historical 








III. THE SEARCH FOR INTERAGENCY EFFECTIVENESS 
A. DEFINING EFFECTIVENESS 
Fusion cells (FC), as previously defined, involve co-locating personnel from 
multiple government agencies under a common chain of command in order to reach 
objectives in a manner that is more effective than unilateral efforts by any single agency.  
Fusion cells are a micro and, at their best, highly effective example of United States 
government (USG) interagency coordination.  They differ from the macro in that, in any 
given fusion cell, a large bureaucracy (e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation) with 
thousands of employees might be represented by a single individual.  However, that 
individual will often bring with him/her the values, norms, and cultural practices of the 
parent agency, making the manner in which fusion cell members interact symbolic of the 
large-scale interactions of their parent agencies.  Therefore, our findings on FC 
effectiveness will be preceded by a discussion of interagency effectiveness, to include 
recent history on interagency reform recommendations and a review of the decades-long 
discussion calling for improvements to the interagency coordination process.  A 
consistent failure to heed these recommendations was identified in post 9/11 U.S. policy 
reviews as a contributing factor to some of the major intelligence and foreign policy 
difficulties in recent U.S. history. 
Interagency effectiveness is a nebulous term due, in large part, to consistent 
disregard for seeking a true definition of the concept within the USG.  It is a subject that 
lends itself to pontification, but seldom to the actual setting of benchmarks that would 
define and codify success (e.g., production of actionable intelligence, crimes/attacks 
thwarted, criminals/terrorists detained).  Such codification would allow interagency 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness to be empirically measured over time, but the vagueness 
of current terminology makes such empirics difficult to find.  As an example, in a White 
House memorandum released March 19, 2009, National Security Adviser GEN (Ret.) 




At its core, the purpose of the interagency process is to advance the 
President’s policy priorities and, more generally, to serve the national 
interest by ensuring that all agencies and perspectives that can contribute 
to achieving these priorities participate in making and implementing 
policy.23 
In other words, the purpose of interagency collaboration is to ensure interagency 
collaboration.  Such a tautological definition is representative of the difficulty 
encountered in any efforts to quantify the overall effectiveness of interagency 
coordination, as it is currently a concept without deliverables.  Because of the gap 
between theory and practical application, little real doctrinal work on the evolution of 
interagency effectiveness over time has emerged.  Therefore, as the authors did with the 
term ‘fusion cell,’ we will also offer a definition of interagency effectiveness.  
Interagency effectiveness will henceforth refer to the ability of two or more USG 
agencies to coordinate in a rapid and routine manner on problems that are broader than 
the mission set of any one agency, so that their combined abilities allow for the 
identification, deconstruction, and management of formerly inaccessible problems. 
B. HISTORY OF INTERAGENCY REFORM 
Identifying the need for effective coordination between national agencies is 
neither a new concept nor a product of the post-9/11 conflict.  As noted in the Project on 
National Security Reform’s (PNSR) 2008 study Forging a New Shield (FNS), the issue of 
national security reform, often directed at improving coordination between various 
elements, has been in evolution since 1947’s National Security Act.  This act created the 
organizations that are the cornerstones of today’s foreign policy decision making 
apparatus, to include the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the 
modern intelligence community.24  As the authors of FNS suggest, “it might seem as if 
the national security system is constantly evolving. Over the past six decades, there have 
been hundreds of major and minor reforms as well as numerous commission reports and 
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studies.”25  Additionally, the National Security Act of 1947 has been under regular 
review and modification since its inception.  Beginning with the Hoover Commission of 
1949, which strengthened the U.S. military’s role in national decision making, each 
administration from Truman to Carter attempted to improve the structure that drives 
national security coordination and decision making.26  Late in the Cold War, President 
Reagan released National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 276 with the intent of 
improving the efficiency of interagency coordination at the most senior levels of 
government, which had been advanced in NSDD-2 and NSDD-266 (also under Reagan), 
but required additional refining: 
Under NSDD-266, the National Security advisor was ordered to review 
the complex NSC substructures established by NSDD-2 [released in 
1982].  Based on this review, Reagan issued NSDD-276 months later, 
which superseded all applicable directives and transformed the NSC 
system from a highly complex and largely unmanageable body into a 
simpler and streamlined organization.27 
Under NSDD-2 President Reagan had established “interagency groups” to cross-level 
information, but these elements were inefficient.  Reagan offered, in NSDD-276, a metric 
for grading effective interagency coordination when he stated that interagency groups, 
“achieve their goal when they provide thorough and clear analyses of all policy choices, 
coordinate policy implementation, and review policy in light of experience.”28  NSDD-
276 represents one of the first efforts to quantify what successful interagency 
coordination would look like, but it still did not provide a basis of irrefutable empirics.  
The end product of NSDD-276 was policy advice, not action. 
Decades after Reagan’s reform efforts, interagency coordination still remained a 
significant hurdle to USG efficiency.  The now prophetic findings of the February 2001 
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Hart-Rudman Commission, Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for Change, cited 
the need for establishing interagency coordination groups as part of each of its five major 
recommendations for reform.  While the areas identified as needing reform varied from 
protection of the American homeland to shortcomings of the USG personnel system, each 
area notes that a lack of interagency coordination has led to decades of stovepipes and 
inefficiencies.  The issue lies at the core of the commission’s most famous prediction, as 
it was released just seven-months before Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks: 
A direct attack against American citizens on American soil is likely over 
the next quarter century. The risk is not only death and destruction but also 
a demoralization that could undermine U.S. global leadership.  In the face 
of this threat, our nation has no coherent or integrated governmental 
structures.29 
The commission goes on to describe such “integrated governmental structures” as 
interagency teams established on a temporary or permanent basis to address inefficiencies 
in government coordination, policy creation, and information sharing.   
Most notable amongst these areas is the commission’s identification of 
shortcomings in USG ability to manage future conflict.  They noted that the regional 
view of the military’s geographic Commanders in Charge (CINCs, now Geographic 
Combatant Commanders—GCCs) was not in line with the USG diplomatic view of the 
world, where Ambassadors have a single country view.  The Hart-Rudman Commission 
also highlighted that the existing USG structure impedes the Department of State (DOS) 
from efficiently implementing regional policies or monitoring regional threats and makes 
the viewpoints of DOS and DoD incongruent, as DoD members maintained a regional 
view through the CINC system.  Simply put, “a gap exists between the CINC, who 
operates on a regional basis, and the Ambassador, who is responsible for activities within 
one country.”30   In today’s world, we see examples of this in the intelligence 
community’s efforts to monitor the regional goals of trans-national terrorists who, while 
                                                 
29 Gary Hart, et. al. Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change. (Washington, D.C.: The 
United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, 2008), viii. 




living in a given country may present no overt threat and are therefore not seen as a 
destabilizing force by DOS personnel in that specific nation.  This disaggregate 
relationship creates the very space wherein a non-state terrorist actor is able to work.  
Having identified this issue prior to the 9/11 attacks, Hart-Rudman called for the National 
Security Council (NSC) to “establish NSC interagency working groups for each major 
region, chaired by the respective regional Under Secretary of State, to develop regional 
strategies and coordinated government-wide plans for their implementation.”31 
Following the 9/11 attacks and the release of the 9/11 Commission Report, 
Congress and the Bush administration adopted a top-down reform approach.  With the 
“Intelligence Community Leadership Act of 2002,” Congress created the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) position in order to establish an overarching manager of all 
intelligence organizations.32  Traditionally, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) had 
served as senior advisor to the President on intelligence matters while also running the 
Central Intelligence Agency.  Following the creation of the DNI, President Bush penned 
Executive Order 13355, in which he established that the DCI was subordinate to the 
newly created DNI.33  These top-down reform measures hoped to synchronize 
intelligence efforts by clarifying the hierarchy.  But no one person or staff can possibly 
manage and coordinate the efforts of the entire intelligence community, regardless of 
who reports to whom on a line-diagram.  The failures leading to 9/11 led to the creation 
of even more hierarchy and bureaucracy, but did not address interagency coordination at 
the ground-level. 
Such findings are not surprising when one considers the complexity of managing 
national security and the relationship between the organizational structures currently 
tasked with that job.  In 1980, Henry Mintzberg wrote, “Organizational Design: Fashion 
or Fit?” for Harvard Business Review.  It is a cornerstone work on modern organizational 
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design theory, and the fundamentals presented by Mintzberg hold true today.  Mintzberg 
presents five type of bureaucratic structures (simple, professional, machine, 
divisionalized, and ad-hoc), and today’s USG structure clearly falls in the divisionalized 
form.34  A divisionalized organization is, “a set of rather independent entities joined 
together by a loose administrative overlay.”35  This is an apt descriptor for the 
relationship between the Executive-NSC (administrative overlay) and the various 
national organizations involved in national security (independent entities).  Mintzberg’s 
focus was on the business world where there were measurable outputs (products, profits) 
– success of the divisionalized structure could be regulated by standardization of output.  
If a division were not meeting the standard (producing widgets accurately or fast 
enough), then it would be overhauled.  However, as is the central core of measuring 
interagency effectiveness, measuring the output of national security organizations 
(including DOJ, DoD, CIA) is exceptionally difficult.  The problem is that these national 
organizations are happy to exist within the lanes of their ‘division,’ from which 
perspective any given organization never has a sufficient view to truly see the enemy 
network, and therefore can never be held truly responsible for missing the activities of 
that network. 
Horizontal connectivity is required to coordinate Mintzberg’s divisions when 
there is not a visible, tangible output.  Robert Polk, member of the PNSR and advisor to 
its founder, Jim Locher, points to this fact in his article, “Interagency Reform: An Idea 
Whose Time has come.”36  Polk refers to Mintzberg’s divisions as stovepipes, noting that 
today’s environment demands horizontal communication between elements: 
The private sector learned years ago how to organize and manage its 
resources in order to stay competitive.  It learned that problems often 
present themselves in ways that demand a team approach rather than one 
                                                 
34 Henry Mintzberg, “Organizational Design: Fashion or Fit,” Harvard Business Review, January 1, 
1981, 4. 
35 Ibid., 9. 
36 R.B. Polk,  “Interagency reform: an idea whose time has come.” in The Interagency and 
counterinsurgency warfare: stability, security, transition, and reconstruction roles, eds. J.R. Cerami and 




based on stovepiped, or independent, subordinate elements.  Yet, instead 
of doing away with the stovepipes, e.g., the offices, altogether, they 
simply added horizontal teams to their organization…This new horizontal 
team concept was so-named because it provided a place for members from 
across the other stovepipes to come together horizontally and participate in 
solving a common problem together.37 
The DoD, Polk argues, discovered a method for overcoming inter-service stovepipes 
when forces deploy forward—the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC).  These 
theater commanders create joint staffs to establish a cross-service approach to regional 
problem-sets.  Though not always perfect, these efforts have proven effective at 
coordinating multi-service military efforts in theater between elements that had not 
previously worked together.  “The time is now at hand,” Polk concludes, “for the U.S. 
government to consider a more wholesale adaptation of the horizontal team approach to 
its national security system.”38 
Seven months prior to the September 2001 attacks, the Hart-Rudman commission 
had accurately identified the inability of the USG to efficiently address the actions of a 
non-state actor such as Al Qaeda.  The terrorist group’s non-allegiance to any 
diplomatically recognized system placed them outside of the established structure of the 
USG.  In this vast space, the group was able to live, plan, and coordinate their activities 
while remaining essentially impervious to USG efforts.  Hart-Rudman had correctly and 
prophetically identified that the USG had created a wide array of powerful organizations, 
but lacked the ability to fuse individual efforts, thereby making the nation highly 
vulnerable to attacks “at the seams.” 
C. LESSONS FROM THE COLD WAR 
It is understandable that the USG might feel little need to thoroughly address 
interagency reform in the 1990s.  At that point, the United States had just prevailed 
against its largest strategic threat between World War II and the 1990s—the Soviet Union 
– albeit while suffering through an unending draw (Korea), a significant loss (Vietnam), 
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and several embarrassments (e.g., Beirut, Grenada) along the way.  The Cold War 
dominated the strategic thought process of eight administrations, from Harry Truman to 
Ronald Reagan.  From Winston Churchill’s 1946 “Iron Curtain” speech to Ronald 
Reagan’s 1987 “Tear Down this Wall” speech, the U.S. faced a near-half century struggle 
during which interagency reforms were never thoroughly addressed; yet the U.S. was still 
victorious.  How, one might ask, was such a victory possible without interagency 
effectiveness; or inversely, why is interagency effectiveness a modern-day priority if the 
Cold War could be won without it?  One must also consider the view first suggested by 
George Kennan in his 1946 “Long Telegram” that, if thoroughly contained (militarily, 
politically, economically), the Soviet Union was destined for failure.  Kennan saw 
communism as, “a malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue,” and believed 
it would implode if prevented from expanding.39  From this perspective, did the U.S. 
system win the Cold War, or was the Soviet Union simply effectively contained, thereby 
self-destructing?  We must not draw the wrong lessons from the Cold War and 
overestimate the effectiveness of the structures established by the United States during 
that conflict, especially given today’s radically different national security environment. 
The differences between the Cold War and the current global situation are not 
difficult to identify.  First, the Cold War was a state-on-state conflict wherein the United 
States and Soviet Union mirrored one another’s growth and capabilities in a classic game 
of strategic maneuvering.  The CIA faced the KGB; the DoD faced the Soviet military; 
nuclear arsenals were developed in kind; troops, tanks and aircraft were increased and 
positioned based on enemy posturing.  The Cold War was a game of strategy where two 
major powers utilized the resources of their states and numerous proxies (e.g., North 
Vietnam, Afghanistan’s Mujahedeen) to outmaneuver the enemy.  As different as the 
ideologies were between communism and democracy, the conflict was approached in a 
very similar manner by both regimes – build up forces and assets, establish allies, and 
gain strategic positioning. As a result, the U.S. and Soviet systems developed similar 
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seams between their major organizations; however, since each side chose to maintain a 
symmetric approach to the problem, the United States was able to avoid true interagency 
reform and still prevail. 
One notable example demonstrating the advantage of having a relatively stable 
strategic game between the U.S. and Soviet Union is seen in the Cuban Missile Crisis.  In 
his seminal work on the topic, Essence of Decision, Graham Allison offers a thorough 
analysis of many U.S. missteps throughout the thirteen days of October, 1962 when the 
crisis was the sole focus of the Kennedy administration.  The crisis, indeed the entire 
Cold War, was framed in the concept of the Rational Actor Model (RAM), which Allison 
defines as, “the attempt to explain international events by recounting the aims and 
calculations of nations or governments.”40  Believing that your adversary is rational in his 
decision making, and assuming that he believes the same about you, allows for balanced 
signaling wherein your actions send messages and your adversary’s actions can be 
interpreted.  This symmetry allows for missteps, such as the accidental encroachment of a 
U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft into Soviet airspace during the peak of the crisis, to be 
analyzed by the enemy with the assumption that a rational opponent (the U.S.) would not 
want to start a nuclear war.41  In such an environment, where two goliaths mirror one 
another in capability and are assumed rational, there is time and space for each nation’s 
major organizations to analyze their opponent’s actions and react appropriately.  Even 
during the missteps of the Cuban Missile Crisis, tragedy was ultimately (though just 
barely) avoided despite ineffective interagency coordination.  While the Executive 
Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom) was an ad-hoc effort to pull 
together the appropriate advisors for President Kennedy, its efforts were based on 
personality and relationships, not established doctrine.42  The Cuban Missile Crisis, and 
indeed the entire Cold War, was a balanced game of strategy where each player was 
assumed to be rational and therefore not trying to escalate to the level of nuclear war.   
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D. TODAY’S STRUGGLE: A DIFFERENT GAME 
Today’s enemy is not playing a symmetric game of strategy, and certainly cannot 
be considered rational under traditional theory.  Escalation on a global scale (not de-
escalation), as argued by Fawaz Gerges, has been the true goal of Al Qaeda and its 
associated movements since the mid-1990s.  Escalation with the West is seen as tool to 
create a common enemy that would unite the many varied jihadist groups that evolved in 
the post-colonial Middle East, most of which were effectively suppressed by Western-
backed regimes: 
Taking jihad global would put an end to the internal war that roiled the 
jihadist movement after it was defeated by local Muslim regimes.  ‘The 
solution’ was to drag the United States into a total confrontation with the 
ummah and wake Muslims from their political slumber.43 
An important goal of today’s adversary is to constantly increase the size and power of 
their network (high profile operations + responses from Western media / military / 
governments = additional resources and recruits) in order to create a global network that 
is not constrained by the bureaucratic relationships that exist in the United States and 
other nation state governments.  These Cold War organizations, when not themselves 
networked, leave large seams in the national security apparatus of the United States that 
are pervious to attack from an enemy with resources, personnel, and financing, but 
without similar constraints.  As nation states, the United States and her allies have a 
world view driven by these bureaucratic structures despite the fact that the enemy 
situation has evolved beyond these channelized capabilities.  In Worst Enemy John 
Arquilla (a founding theorist of netwarfare) suggests that the USG’s insistence on seeing 
the world through established bureaucratic structures has created an institutional 
blindness to the fact that our enemy is operating as a coordinated network: 
 
 
                                                 





We have continued to pursue our well-worn paths despite the fact that our 
experiences of the past several years suggest the urgent need to think in 
terms of netwar, to recognize that the hallowed principles of war have 
been affected by the emergence of the network.  Our reluctance to make 
this intellectual leap imperils us the most.44 
Today’s terror networks cross both organizational and nation-state boundaries, therefore 
the requirement for effective interagency cooperation cannot be left unaddressed.   
In today’s conflict, the most effective counter-terrorism fusion cells brings 
together the right people from the right organizations, creating a friendly network that is 
able to close the bureaucratic-seams that have been effectively exploited by the enemy 
network.  In his earlier work with fellow netwar theorist, David Ronfeldt, Arquilla made 
the now oft-quoted comment that, “it takes networks to fight networks.”45  Creation of 
these intelligence-networks, “will require very effective interagency operations, which by 
their very nature involve networked structures.”46   The counter-terrorism fusion cell is 
one of the few organizations in today’s arsenal that has answered this call; therefore, 
studying their effectiveness offers key insights into macro-level interagency reform.  The 
fusion cell unit of analysis is the individual member, but these individuals represent an 
agency of the USG and bring with them the cultural norms of that agency.  Thus, the 
organizational hurdles faced by a given fusion cell provide a view of the issues that larger 
interagency reform efforts will encounter.  
Given the history of senior level analysis identifying the shortcomings in 
interagency coordination, it is notable that Forging a New Shield highlights many of the 
same problems (published seven years into the current conflict).  The study’s premise is 
that the United States has failed to enact sufficient reforms since the National Security 
Act of 1947, and is therefore trying to manage a modern conflict with a system designed 
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to address the post-World War II paradigm, noting that the “national security system 
faces twenty-first century challenges but it is far from being a twenty-first century 
organization.”47  The authors note that: 
the U.S. national security system is still organized to win the last 
challenge, not the ones that come increasingly before us.  We have not 
kept up with the character and scope of change in the world despite the 
tectonic shift occasioned by the end of the Cold War and the shock of the 
911 attacks.  We have responded incrementally, not systematically; we 
have responded with haste driven by political imperatives, not with 
patience and perspicacity.48 
The identification of the problem is not the main issue as the criticality of effective 
interagency coordination has been consistently identified for over 50 years; instead, the 
major flaw lies in the inability of the entrenched bureaucratic system to modify its 
structure and relationships in order to meet the challenges of the current threat 
environment. 
The seams between government agencies, noted by Hart-Rudman in 2001, 
reappear as a theme in 2008.  Bureaucratic parochialism leads the members of any single 
organization to focus first and foremost on the norms and practices of their own 
institution.  Without doctrinal requirements for coordination between organizations there 
is no incentive for members to attempt to bridge the gap - even when such coordination is 
obviously needed in solving a given problem.  As noted in the Hart-Rudman study: 
Interagency staffing is therefore difficult because departments and 
agencies hoard their people. They hoard them because there are no 
incentives in the talent management system for individuals to leave their 
agencies, or for their departments or agencies to share them.49 
The human resource and budgetary incentive structure in USG bureaucracy creates seams 
between USG capabilities, and these seams create blind spots in the USG’s ability to 
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assess and address asymmetric problems that span the focus of multiple organizations.  
The authors note that, “as a consequence, mission-essential capabilities that fall outside 
the core mandates of our departments and agencies are virtually never planned or trained 
for - a veritable formula for being taken unawares and unprepared.”50  When complex 
problem sets arise requiring a fusion of resources and personnel from multiple 
government agencies the current model creates, at best, an ad hoc and temporary solution.   
The solutions proposed in Forging a New Shield, as with previous studies, are all 
grounded in establishing a codified system of interagency coordination.  At the national 
level, this study calls for the creation of two tiers of interagency elements.  The first, 
interagency teams, would be “composed of full-time personnel, properly resourced and of 
flexible duration, and be able to implement a whole-of-government approach to those 
issues beyond the coping capacities of the existing system.”51  These teams would knit 
together the seams that exist between agencies, and create an incentive structure for 
effective interagency coordination by establishing a career outlet for collaborative efforts.  
On an as-needed basis, the study recommends creating “Interagency Task Forces” 
designed to “handle crises that exceed the capacities of both existing departmental 
capabilities and new Interagency Teams.”52  Dynamic modern problems, such as global 
terrorist elements or nation-building efforts in Iraq, would be well suited for such a Task 
Force structure.  This study suggests that both short- and long-term solutions to these 
dynamic problems do not lie in the reform of any given agency, but in creating a system 
whereby the capabilities of multiple agencies can be effectively fused for rapid and 
effective decision making. 
From President Truman to the current environment, the answers to creating a 
more effective interagency environment have been of a similar theme.  The cornerstone 
of such efforts is the need for interagency groups whose charter is to fuse the talent, 
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resources, and unique capabilities of multiple organizations.  The studies discussed thus 
far have focused on national-level reform, in large part because (as previously noted) 
there has been little attention given to micro-level efforts focused on interagency 
collaboration.  This study will now do just that, and discuss the findings of our research 
on interagency fusion cells.  Significant lessons for macro-level improvements in 
interagency effectiveness may be derived from these relatively small elements that are 




IV. SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
There is no standard doctrine or template for intelligence fusion cells.  For 
example, the 72 state and local fusion cells recognized by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) are each designed differently, responding to the unique requirements 
particular to the creation of that cell.  Department of Defense (DoD) fusion cells and FBI 
JTTFs are no different; they are task-organized to respond to a particular problem set.  
There is one basic principle that fusion cells do follow: members from different agencies 
(law enforcement or government) come together to combine their expertise.   
This variance in fusion cells creates a measurement problem concerning how one 
can measure fusion cell effectiveness given the range of fusion cell models, mission, 
location, and membership.  The authors decided to create and distribute a survey to 
individuals who may have served (or may be currently serving) on fusion cells.  This 
chapter will further discuss our choice of measurement techniques, survey methodology 
and challenges, ways we overcame those challenges, and future research suggestions.    
B.  SURVEY DESIGN AND DISTRIBUTION 
The wide variety of fusion cells challenged the authors with how could we 
operationalize our hypothesis.  With 72 State and Local Fusion Centers,53 and 106 FBI 
JTTFs or JTTF annexes in the US,54 and approximately 20 DoD fusion cells OCONUS, 
we determined that visiting a majority of them was not feasible given our research 
resources and time.  Instead, in order to gather information across the various types of 
fusion cells and the varied membership in those cells, we utilized an online unclassified 
survey. The survey is comprised of 33 questions with Likert scale responses, nine 
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background information questions, and five open-ended comment questions.55  Five to 
six questions are grouped together per each independent variable: access to decision 
makers, membership, level of empowerment, decision making process / information flow, 
and leadership. The responses to these questions provided the raw data for analysis in 
Chapter V.    
The survey was sent out to approximately 4,000 individuals who subscribe to the 
Military Intelligence Listserv on the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) network, the 
directors of the 72 state and local fusion cells in the United States, and approximately 15 
individuals whom the authors worked with on prior assignments with fusion cell 
experience.  From this sample size, over 200 individuals initiated taking the survey and 
110 individuals completed it. 69% of those completing the survey answered that they 
were part of DoD, 4% from DHS, 1% from DOJ, 14% from state or local law 
enforcement, and 12% from other governmental agencies (e.g., CIA, NSA).  
Additionally, the authors conducted face-to-face or phone interviews with 20 individuals 
who were either former members of fusion cells, fusion cell leaders, or consumers of 
fusion cell products. 
C.  SURVEY CHALLENGES 
One major hurdle the authors had to overcome was how to get our survey out to 
those individuals who have the requisite experience to be of value to our research.  To 
ensure our sample size was large enough to lend validity to the data collected, we elected 
to cast a wide net in the distribution of our survey.  As mentioned, we utilized the AKO 
Listserv to send the majority of our surveys out and reach the widest audience of people 
who possibly had fusion cell experience.  The Listserv sends emails, sometimes over a 
dozen per day, with pertinent content to all members and our survey went out as one of 
those emails.   
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Another challenge in designing the survey to collect needed data was the variation 
of fusion cells.  The authors originally planned on collecting data on only DoD fusion 
cells but added the CONUS-based, law enforcement focused fusion centers since they are 
critical in the evolution of fusion cells.  The survey thus had to include questions which 
could draw out relevant data from survey participants - irrespective of the organization 
they work for or what kind of fusion cell they worked in.    
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of collecting data for this thesis was the lack 
of any common definition as to how each fusion cell measures (defines) its own 
effectiveness.  One U.S. Army officer interviewed for this thesis with first-hand 
experience in fusion cell operations stated that effectiveness, while not tracked habitually 
and not codified as the definite yard stick, was measured by comparing the percentage of 
targetable intelligence provided by the fusion cell to an operational element with the 
percentage of that intelligence which led to successful operations.56 This rough measure 
was often cited during the authors’ research and interviews as being used by deployed 
DoD fusion cells.  The operational tempo (optempo) of deployed DoD elements 
combined with often near immediate and tangible results from combat operations allows 
deployed DoD fusion cells supporting combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to 
utilize this measure of effectiveness. 
By comparison, fusion cells located in the U.S. frequently have a much slower 
operational tempo and less immediacy in the targets they work day after day.  One State 
and Local fusion center director interviewed explained that, since the fusion center he 
worked in was relatively new, success was measured by simply getting all the right 
organizations in one room talking and working together.57  While lacking the empirical 
measure often utilized by DoD, this measure does address the goal of fusion cells of 
bringing organizations together in one place to work towards a common mission when 
they would not have been working as closely together were there not a fusion cell. 
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From a social science perspective, this proved particularly limiting when trying to 
measure our independent variables against the dependent variable of fusion cell 
effectiveness.  Simply put, because no fusion cell uses the same measure of how effective 
it is, the authors could not empirically measure the dependent variable of fusion cell 
effectiveness across the various types of fusion cells in order to compare which types are 
most effective and why.   
D.  CHALLENGES PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES 
The methods used to distribute our survey did indeed succeed in getting the 
survey out to a wide audience.  However, only 2.5% of the surveys sent out were 
completed online.  The low percentage of responses is attributed to the small percentage 
of personnel on the Listserv who actually had fusion cell experience and were willing to 
take a survey (no matter how well designed) elaborating on their experiences.  The fact 
that those responding had to actively choose to participate in the survey by opening the 
email, going to the survey link, and taking the time to complete the survey, gives the 
authors a high degree of confidence that the survey responses contain data from 
personnel with real fusion cell experiences.   
The lack of common definitions on how to measure fusion cell success combined 
with the great variance of fusion cell structure, mission, and membership led the authors 
to create variables that capture measures of effectiveness which are applicable across the 
spectrum of variance in fusion cells.  The data submitted by survey participants and the 
interviews conducted by the authors provides an excellent measure of what makes fusion 
cells effective from both the perspective of fusion cell members and consumers of fusion 
cell data.  While hard numbers, such as a comparative ratio of data provided by a fusion 
cell to targets successfully prosecuted from that data, can rarely be applied to measure the 
success of fusion cells, the data collected from our surveys and interviews illustrates 
those conditions, which are individually necessary and collectively sufficient to equal a 




As highlighted earlier in this chapter, the majority of the surveys were received 
from DoD personnel.  The fact that 69% of our completed surveys come from one 
organization cautioned the authors to examine our data closely for any institutional bias 
which may result from the majority of the surveys coming from DoD personnel.  
However, with slightly under 1/3 of our returned surveys coming from outside DoD, we 
are confident we have a sufficient amount of data to compare with the DoD surveys and 
control for bias. 
E.  FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis seeks to understand what makes fusion cells effective.  More research 
needs to be done on the more technical aspects of how to improve fusion cells.  What 
advances and innovations in computers and network technology can be leveraged to 
improve fusion cell effectiveness?  What tools are available so fusion cell members can 
quickly and virtually interact with their counterparts around the world?   
More research can be done on what training fusion cell personnel and leaders 
need to be more effective.  One promising development is as of winter 2009/10 the Naval 
Postgraduate School is creating a course to help train fusion cell directors.  A major item 
which needs to researched and trained is how to improve information sharing and 
transparency amongst fusion cell members. 
Despite the challenges of administering a survey virtually to many different 
locations and organizations, the responses received contain sufficient data to support a 
robust analysis of those factors that make fusion cells effective.  The interviews 
conducted provided excellent amplifying data and much anecdotal evidence which is 
sometimes lost when relying purely on hard numbers from survey data.  In Chapters V 
and VI, the authors will examine exactly what the data from the surveys and interviews 








V. RESEARCH RESULTS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Fusion Cell (FC) veterans, with an average of 20 years of government experience, 
indicated that the most important variables bearing on FC effectiveness were access to 
decision makers and decision-making process/information flow.  We determined this by 
analyzing 115 survey responses and conducting 20 interviews with FC veterans.  We 
sought to determine the nature of the relationship between effectiveness and our 
independent variables: access to decision makers, cell membership, level of individual 
empowerment, decision making process/information flow, and leadership influence 
effectiveness.  The results are presented in six sections: demographic background, 
descriptive statistics, regression analysis, interview responses, measures of effectiveness, 
and summary. 
We examined how each of the five variables influences effectiveness via 
descriptive statistics and regression analysis.  Our survey results and research revealed 
that currently there is no standard, commonly excepted definition for FC effectiveness 
(our dependent variable).  We then analyzed the survey and chose four possible proxy 
dependent variables that had the potential to best represent effectiveness.  Three of these 
proxy questions came from our independent variable “access to decision makers” and the 
fourth was not a component of any of our independent variables.  This analysis concluded 
that the best fit was achieved by using the fourth proxy question, “This FC is effective.”  
We arrived at this conclusion via regression analysis and by determining that using 
questions from an existing independent variable damaged the integrity of the overall 
model.58  
Both descriptive statistics and regression analysis brought out important findings 
on how to improve the effectiveness of FCs.  For the descriptive statistical analysis 
below, we analyzed the overall results by each independent variable.  This section also 
                                                 




incorporates the results of item-level frequency analyses.  The regression analysis 
examines both the overall model and each of the subset models (DoD, State and Local, 
and Other Governmental Agencies).  
Regression analysis discusses both the statistical and substantive significance of 
our results.  As mentioned above, regression analysis revealed that our hypothesis has 
explanatory power with respect to the overall model, but that there are significant 
statistical variations within our subset models (findings with p>0.10; relaxed from 0.05 
due to small sample size).  In our analysis, we focus on the interpretation of statistically 
significant factors (p<0.10) and try to understand why some factors are less robust 
(p>0.10).  Our substantive interpretation of the regression results is supplemented by our 
professional experience, in-depth interviews, and descriptive statistics.  In essence, in 
those cases where our subset models did not conform to the overall model and do not 
have statistical relevance, we present possible explanations as to why this is so and 
encourage further study in these areas.  
Interviews confirmed the overall findings and highlighted internal FC functional 
issues (training, politics) and larger structural impediments concerning parent agency 
support to FCs.  The survey and interview research also revealed a significant structural 
problem with how FC’s measure effectiveness.  Currently, almost every FC has their own 
unique measures of effectiveness and their own methodology on how to determine if they 
have been effective.  
B. DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND 
Demographic responses indicate respondents have exceptional experience levels, 
both overall and on FCs.  Survey participants were more likely from the Department of 
Defense than any other agency (60/40% split), had spent an average of 25 months on an 
FC, and had over 20 years of government experience.59  Survey participants most likely 
were not currently serving on an FC, and when they were, it was just as likely to be 
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located OCONUS as CONUS.  Survey responses determined that FC’s averaged 29 
individuals in size and the majority supported six or more separate agencies.60   
C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
As discussed in Chapter IV, the authors developed the survey questions from their 
experiences on and working with FCs as well as a review of the relevant literature.  The 
questions used a six point Likert-type scale that ranged from Strongly Disagree to 
Strongly Agree.  With this scale there is no midpoint rating.  For this scale a mean value 
greater than 3.5 indicates agreement and less than 3.5 indicates disagreement.  We 
developed five scales that correspond to our independent variables; (1) access to decision 
makers, (2) cell membership, (3) level of individual empowerment, (4) decision-making 
process and information flow, and (5) leadership.  We first analyze some of the overall 
descriptive statistics and discuss each variable with its associated questions.  We then 
present a summary of descriptive statistics. 
1.  Overall Model 
Leadership had the highest independent variable means (4.8) and empowerment 
had the lowest (4.0).  Looking at individual questions, “Intelligence products reach 
decision makers” (Q10) had the highest results for agreement with a mean of 5.1.61  The 
other most positive results (mean of 5.0) were found with the following questions: “pass 
time sensitive information to decision makers” (Q14), “clearly understand requirements 
from other FC members” (Q34), and “FC leadership understands the importance of 
interagency relationships (Q41).  The question with the least agreement with a mean of 
3.8 was Q18, “FC members arrived with sufficient experience to be an asset”.  Other low 
results (mean of 3.9) were found with the following questions: “leadership regularly 
visits (Q15), “parent organization prepared me for the FC mission (Q22), and “parent 
organization prepared me clear guidance as to my role in the FC (Q28).  We asked four 
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questions in this survey where “agreement” as a response was undesirable (Q26-27 and 
Q36-37).  These questions were recoded to make their responses analytically compatible 
with the rest of the survey.  Of note, Q26 (routinely consult parent organization prior to 
releasing information to the Fusion Cell, mean of 3.4) and Q27 (required to consult 
parent organization prior to offering input on critical matters, mean of 3.0), have the 
lowest mean values in the survey after recoding for comparability.  In summary, across 
all of our independent variables there are areas where FCs can/need to improve their 
performance.  Table 1 includes the means and standard deviations for the independent 
variables. 
Independent Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Access to Decision Makers 4.4 1.3 
Cell Membership 4.1 1.4 
Empowerment 4.0 1.5 
Decision Making Process/Information Flow 4.4 1.4 
Leadership 4.8 1.2 
Table 1. Independent Variable Means and Standard Deviations 
2.  Access to Decision Makers   
The results in Table 2 show that overall, survey respondents believe their products 
influence decision makers and more importantly, that those products are involved in the 
decision making cycle.  Being able to “do” something with the information and analysis 
is an important component in a FC’s overall effectiveness.  Regardless of whether or not 
a capture/kill mission launches or state police execute a search warrant as a result of an 
FC’s hard work, the FC must interface with a decision maker who has the authority to 
execute action.  If a FC has either a direct line or a trusted relationship with decision 
makers, their ability to turn analysis into action is greatly enhanced.   
Table 2 indicates that overall FC participants report that their own influence on 
decision makers is robust (Q10 mean of 5.1).  However, questions oriented specifically 
on the personal relationship between decision makers and FCs revealed a less direct 
relationship.  Almost 40% of respondents believe they did not receive regular feedback 




believe senior leaders did not visit regularly their FC (Q15).62  These questions 
concerning the FC/senior leader relationship have the highest standard deviations; 
suggesting there is some disparity across FCs on this subject.  If access to decision 
making is the most important variable (via regression analysis), then questions describing 
the relationship between an FC and those decision makers are important.  Assuming that 
more interaction between an FC and senior leaders is positive, then the results for Q13 
and Q15 are suggest areas where specific improvements could be made to increase FC 
effectiveness.  
 
Questions for Access to Decision Makers Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Q10.  Intelligence products influence decision makers. 5.1 1.1 
Q11.  Intelligence products reach all key decision makers. 4.3 1.2 
Q12.  Intelligence products reach decision makers fast enough to 
positively effect outcomes. 
4.4 1.2 
Q13.  Receives regular feedback from the leadership of the 
organizations supported. 
3.9 1.4 
Q14.  Can immediately pass time sensitive targeting intelligence to 
key decision makers. 
5.0 1.5 
Q15.  Supported organizations leadership regularly visits. 3.9 1.5 
Access to Decision Makers Scale Statistics 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Cronbach’s Alpha 
4.4 1.3 112 0.89 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Access to Decision Makers 
3.  Cell Membership   
We hypothesize that FCs must have interagency representation and high quality 
personnel in order properly conduct fusion.  More than 70% of survey respondents agreed 
that FCs had appropriate interagency representation (Q19: 73% agreed) and trained 
individuals (Q16: 77% agreed).  While this is a strong majority, it is important to note 
that roughly 30% did not think their FC had appropriate interagency representation.    
Interview responses indicated that some agencies are more important to include in a FC 
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than others; however, there is no standard template or doctrine concerning what that mix 
should be.  In addition, interview results confirmed and further highlighted the 
importance of FC personnel training.  Survey results further confirmed this finding; 39% 
of respondents did not believe “every member had sufficient experience” (Q18) and 37% 
did not believe their “parent unit trained them properly” (Q22). 
The results in Table 3 below indicate that there is general, albeit not enthusiastic, 
agreement concerning the proper mix, size, and personnel capabilities of FCs (Q19 mean 
of 4.2 and Q21 mean of 4.1).  Survey respondents had the opportunity to suggest other 
organizations that should be on their FC.  Less than one-third of respondents did and their 
responses did not have any pattern or trends.  There is less consensus and belief that FC 
members arrive with the appropriate skills to be successful (Q18 mean of 3.8, Q20 mean 
of 4.0, Q22 mean of 3.9).  The item with the highest standard deviation for this 
independent variable (IV) concerns how parent organizations prepare their personnel 
(Q22).  This suggests some disparity among organizations (i.e., some do a better job than 
others).  Further analysis of the question concerning whether or not your parent 
organization prepared you properly reveals that OGA respondents had the highest 
standard deviation (1.8).  These results suggest that organizations that provide personnel 





Questions for Cell Membership Mean Standard 
Deviation
Q16.  Members have the proper level of training to be effective. 4.1 1.4 
Q17.  Other members are top-level performers. 4.4 1.2 
Q18.  Every member arrived with sufficient experience to be an 
asset to the mission. 
3.8 1.4 
Q19.  Have the appropriate military and civilian organizations to 
execute its mission. 
4.2 1.0 
Q20.  Parent organization carefully selects and screens personnel 
to Fusion Cells. 
4.0 1.5 
Q21.  Has the appropriate number of personnel to be effective. 4.1 1.3 
Q22.  Parent organization properly prepared me to be an effective 
member of this Fusion Cell. 
3.9 1.6 
Access to Decision Makers Scale Statistics 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
4.1 1.4 112 0.78 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Cell Membership 
4. Level of Individual Empowerment   
This scale seeks to illuminate how much authority an FC member’s parent 
organization delegated to him/her on the FC.  Our hypothesis is that more delegation is 
better because it would enable the FC member to respond to the unique 
needs/requirements of the FC more efficiently.  Agreement is undesirable on the 
questions regarding the routine practice of consulting the parent organization (Q26) and 
the requirement to consult the parent organization (Q27).  In order to compare these 
questions to the other scales, they must be reverse coded (1=6, 2=5, 3=4, 4=3, 5=2, 6=1).  
Questions in this scale seek to determine the nature of the FC member’s relationship with 





Questions for Level of Individual Empowerment Mean Standard 
Deviation
Q23.  Regular contact with parent organization. 4.8 1.2 
Q24.  Have access to appropriate personnel in parent organization to 
support the Fusion Cell mission. 
4.5 1.5 
Q25.  Empowered by parent organization to make rapid decisions. 4.5 1.4 
Q26.  Routinely consult parent organization prior to releasing 
information to the Fusion Cell. 
3.4* 1.6 
Q27.  Required to consult parent organization prior to offering input 
on critical matters. 
3.0* 1.5 
Q28.  Parent organization gave clear guidance as to my role within 
the Fusion Cell. 
3.9 1.6 
Q29.  Parent organization clearly understands my role within the 
Fusion Cell. 
4.1 1.6 
Access to Decision Makers Scale Statistics 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
4.0 1.5 111 0.84 
*Item was reverse coded for comparability of means. 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Level of Individual Empowerment 
Clearly, empowerment is an issue.  Not all FC members have the ability to release 
information within the cell or provide input on critical matters without consulting their 
parent organization (Q26 mean 3.4 and Q27 mean 3.0).  Interestingly, for this scale state 
and local respondents were the least empowered group (mean of 2.9).  A possible 
explanation is that they have to resolve jurisdictional problems for specific cases.  
Although respondents indicated they were able to get support from their parent 
organization (Q23 mean 4.8 and Q24 mean 4.5), the specific results for state and local 
respondents and overall results for Q26 and Q27 indicate that it is not standard for all 
members to be empowered by their parent organization.  Thus, some FC members cannot 
rapidly decide on their own accord what of their agency’s information is releasable to the 
FC and what input they can provide to the FC (i.e., their agency’s or their own analysis).  
Moreover, it appears that parent organizations do only a fair job at providing guidance to 
cell members (Q28 mean 3.9) and in understanding what their personnel are doing on the 




5. Decision-Making Process and Information Flow   
This scale examines the organizational design of the FC and seeks to illuminate 
what approach to decision-making and information sharing are being used by FCs.  
Again, agreement on the questions regarding members who cannot and will not share 
information (Q36 and Q37) is not desirable.  Reverse coding these two items results in 
Q36 values of 4.0 (those who cannot share) and Q37 values of 3.8 (those that will not 
share information).  Frequency analysis indicates a disparity in the findings: 64% of 
respondents agreed that some members did not share information (Q36); 57% of 
respondents agreed that some members would not share information (Q37); but 83% of 
respondents categorized their FC as having open and complete information sharing 
(Q35).  This is significant and of concern.  An FC’s power is in its ability to integrate 
different specialties and expertise so as to increase its analytic capabilities.  Thus, only 
36% of respondents agreed all FC members shared information (Q36), 43% agreed 
everyone shared information (Q37) and 17% of respondents agreed that their FC did not 
have open and complete information sharing (Q35).  This finding highlights an area for 
further study and one that every FC should examine. 
In terms of FC decision making processes, it appears that respondents moderately 
agree that their FCs have clear internal processes, make decisions rapidly, understand 
their fellow FC member requirements, and can access operational elements easily 
(respective means of Q30 of 4.5, Q31 of 4.4, Q32 of 5.0, and Q33 of 4.6).  In fact, 
respondents were quite uniform in their agreement, only varying one percentage point 
from 79-80% for Q30-33 and 90% for Q34.  According to this scale, a significant number 
of FCs self characterize their internal decision making processes in positive terms.  
However, as noted above, internal FC information flow is problematic and a potential 





Questions for Decision-Making Process and Information Flow Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Q30.  Clear decision-making process within the Fusion Cell. 4.5 1.4 
Q31.  This Fusion Cell makes rapid decisions. 4.4 1.4 
Q32.  Decision making process within the Fusion Cell is effective. 4.4 1.4 
Q33.  Fusion Cell can easily access operational elements. 4.6 1.4 
Q34.  Clearly understand information required from me by other Fusion 
Cell members. 
5.0 1.0 
Q35.  Norm for this Fusion Cell is open and complete information 
sharing. 
4.7 1.4 
Q36.  There are members of this Fusion Cell who cannot share 
information. 
(4.0) 1.6 
Q37.  There are members of this Fusion Cell who will not share 
information. 
(3.8) 1.7 
Decision Making and Information Flow Scale Statistics 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha
4.4 1.4 112 0.82 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Decision Making Process and Information Flow 
6. Leadership  
This scale seeks to identify what styles or types of leadership are successful in 
FCs.  Our hypothesis, as stated previously, is that FCs that have decentralized 
organization and internal mechanisms characterized by mutual adjustment have better 
outcomes.  The leadership style found in FCs will strongly influence the organizational 
design structure and processes in the FC.  Moreover, leadership style takes on even more 
importance in ad-hoc organizations like FCs due to their personnel and agency mix.   
Respondents identified FC leadership as enabling, encouraging information 
sharing, cognizant of each person’s capabilities, and understanding of the importance of 
interagency relationships (respective means of 4.8, 4.9, 4.8 and 5.0).  Respondents also 
believe that FC leadership appreciates and actively engages key decision makers in the 
organization(s) that the FC supports (direct access mean of 4.9 and regular contact mean 
of 4.6).  This scale has the largest mean and smallest standard deviation; agreement on 
these questions is relatively widespread and uniform.  For example, frequency analysis 
shows that 88% of respondents believed that the leadership of their FC understood the 





Questions on Leadership Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Q38.  Leadership enables the Fusion Cell to accomplish our mission. 4.8 1.3 
Q39.  Leadership encourages transparent information sharing. 4.9 1.2 
Q40.  Leadership understands what I (respondent) have to offer. 4.8 1.2 
Q41.  Leadership understands the importance of positive interagency 
relationships. 
5.0 1.4 
Q42.  Leadership has direct access to key decision makers of the 
organizations we support.   
4.9 1.1 
Q43.  Leadership makes regular contact with the key decision makers of 
the organizations we support. 
4.6 1.3 
Leadership Scale Statistics 
Mean Standard Deviation Sample Size Coefficient Alpha 
4.8 1.2 112 0.90 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for Leadership and Scale 
D. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
We conducted regression analysis on the survey data to test our hypothesis: 
effective FCs are the result of five independent variables: (1) access to decision makers, 
(2) proper FC membership, (3) empowered FC members, (4) flat decision making 
processes/unimpeded information flow, and (5) positive FC leadership.  As discussed in 
Chapter IV, the survey had six to eight questions designed to measure each independent 
variable.  To get each variable’s value, we took the average rating for all questions 
associated with that variable.  We then ran several regressions with proxy dependent 
variables to determine the best fit.  The proxies were survey questions that best 
represented FC effectiveness.63  We found the best correlation between these proxies and 
the independent variables with Q46, “This Fusion Cell is effective.”64  We then divided 
                                                 
63 The proxy dependent variables were (DV1) This Fusion Cell’s products influence decision makers, 
(DV2) This Fusion Cell’s intelligence products reach all key decision makers, (DV3) When necessary, this 
Fusion Cell can immediately pass time-sensitive targeting intelligence to key decision makers, and (DV4) 
This Fusion Cell is effective.  Although proxy DV2 has a R2 value > DV4 and f stat numbers differ (DV2: 
61.38 and DV4: 39.59), it is a better fit because the root MSE values are higher in DV4 and most 
importantly, because DV4 is not part of IV1 like all of the other proxy DVs. 
64 Regression results for each DV proxy are as follows.  DV1: R2 =0.621, f stat=35.18, p stat=0.000, 
root MSE=0.0692, DV2: R2=0.744, f stat=61.83, p stat=0.000, root MSE=0.635, DV3: R2=0.600, f 
stat=31.53, p stat=0.000, root MSE=0.941, DV4: R2=0.675, f stat=39.59, p stat=0.000, root MSE=0.799.  




the data by agency (DoD, State and Local, OGA).  DHS (5) and DoJ (2) were combined 
with OGA to create OGA(+); DHS and DoJ were omitted from OGA(-).  We then 
conducted regression analysis using our proxy dependent variable on the entire sample 
(N=101) and then with DoD (N=67), State and Local (N=21), and OGA(+)  (N=17) and 
OGA(-) (N=12).65  We conducted a variety of tests, including the Ramsey retest to test 
for omitted variables and the Breusch-Pagan test to for heteroscedasticity.  All of these 
tests indicated valid results.66 
1. Results 
The main result is that, for our overall model, all of our independent variables 
have a significant (p<0.05) relationship with the dependent variable.  The two most 
significant variables are access to decision makers and the decision making 
process/information flow.  Further parsing of the data, by agency, exposed important and 
surprising differentiation among variables.  We relaxed the standard for p values to <0.10 
due to our small sample size.  Several of our sub-model results are statistically 
insignificant (p>0.10; shaded areas in table).  We discuss these results in Chapter VI in 
order to understand why they varied from the overall model and to suggest areas of study 
for future research.67  Our analysis leads us to several important conclusions regarding 
FCs and how to improve their effectiveness. 
                                                 
65 OGA (+) includes two respondents from DoJ and three from DHS.  OGA(-) is respondents from 
CIA, NSA, and the NGA.   
66 For the overall model: the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) was 2.47; visual inspection of 
kdensity and pnorm graphs indicate no systemic pattern in the residuals; using the Breusch-Pagan test to 
check for the homogeneity of variance of the residuals results in a p-value of 0.007, using the Ramsey 
retest to check on model specificity results in a p-value of  0.08 thus confirming the model does not appear 
to have omitted variables.  See Appendix I for more details.   
67 Where p>0.10, although statistically insignificant, we will present possible reasons why that specific 
hypothesis may or may not have a substantively significant effect.  Since the overall model is valid, we will 
report on those findings and believe these findings merit further study.  Christopher H. Achen, Interpreting 

































All .52 .00 .18 .01 .07 .05 .48 .00 .10 .05 
DoD .91 .00 .13  .36 -.11 .43 .16 .40 .05  .78 
State Local .46 .26 .40 .26 .07 .86 .61 .12 -.18 .68 
OGA(+) -.05 .78 .06 .80 -.60 .10 1.1 .00 .76 .01 
OGA(-) -.20 .50 -.14 .54 -.75 .07 1.7 .01 .74 .04 
Table 7.  Regression Analysis by coefficient and p-values from Appendix A.  
Shaded areas indicate p>0.10 
a. Complete Model Analysis 
The variables, in rank order of regression coefficients, are access to 
decision makers (0.52), decision making process/information flow (0.48), FC 
membership (0.18), leadership (0.10), and empowerment (0.07).  
  FC’s translate their output (analytical) into action by getting a decision 
maker to authorize a force to take action.  Respondents believe that this is the most 
important variable on FC effectiveness.  Although it may sound like a truism, these 
results confirm that if an FC can get in front of a decision maker, they can be successful.  
The DoD model (discussed below) will further highlight the importance of this variable.   
Examining the individual questions that make up the second most 
important variable, decision-making processes and information flow (see Table 4), 
suggests that FCs are strongly influenced by open information sharing and clear internal 
decision making processes.  Further study is necessary to determine causality between 
these specific attributes and effectiveness.  Furthermore, analysis of respondents who had 
negative comments about this variable (generally due to a lack of information sharing 
within the FC) reinforces this finding.  To be effective, a FC should have internal 
transparency and well-defined internal procedures.  The regression coefficient values 
then tail off significantly for the next three variables, but all are significantly related to 




The relatively low relationship between empowerment and effectiveness 
could be a unit of analysis problem: instead of empowerment from the parent 
organization, it is empowerment within the FC.  FC members are inherently empowered 
from their own perspective because they are the only (usually) representatives of their 
parent organization.  As such, the other FC personnel view fellow members as their 
respective agency’s de facto authority and subject matter expert.  Thus, in the FC, that 
agency representative is the person everyone else goes to with questions and/or requests 
related to that specific agency.  However, fellow members most likely do not have any 
insight into how empowered that person is within their parent organization.  Given these 
internal FC dynamics, FC members may believe that they are all empowered and thus 
may not view this variable as having a strong influence on effectiveness.  For instance, 
82% of respondents agreed to Q25 (empowered by parent organization to make rapid 
decisions).  
Leadership (enabling, encouraging, and guiding the FC) does not have a 
strong influence on effectiveness.  A partial explanation may be that leadership skills are 
not as important in an FC because members are generally experienced, educated, and/or 
peers.  Thus, FC personnel in combination with the dynamic, flat manner in which they 
operate do not require directive leadership.  FC members also may not observe one of the 
critical aspects of leadership at the FC level, interaction with decision makers.  It is 
generally the FC leadership that presents, argues for, and/or advocates for the FC to a 
decision maker.  Thus, it may be that a combination of relatively low leadership 
requirements and unobserved actions resulted in only a slight influence on effectiveness 
for this variable. 
b. DoD Model Analysis 
 The variables are in the same regression coefficient rank order as the 







dependent variable.  A why are all of the other independent variables not statistically 
significant is presented in the Sub-Model variance section below.  The DoD model itself 
is valid.68 
Statistical Analysis:  Why is access to decision makers so critical for DoD 
respondents?  We believe that this finding highlights a “layers of bureaucracy problem” 
within DoD.  Respondents commented on the problem of trying to get an FC action to the 
right decision maker.  In order to get to the decision maker, FC’s have to go through a 
variety of staffs, senior officers, and flag officers.  If an FC can cut through the layers, 
then they can access “the” decision maker (vice a gatekeeper).  We believe that the DoD 
respondents were likely the most sensitive to this problem, thus making it the most 
significant coefficient value for this variable. 
c. State and Local Model Analysis 
Regression coefficient rank order is different from the overall model 
(decision-making process and information flow, access, membership, empowerment, and 
leadership).  However, all independent variables are statistically insignificant due to p-
values ranging from 0.12 to 0.86.  The overall state and local model itself is valid.69  A 
discussion of possible reasons why all of the independent variables are statistically 
insignificant for the State and Local model is presented Chapter VI.  
d. OGA Model Analysis 
This model has two variants: (+) includes DHS and DoJ respondents 
(N=17) and (-) only contains representatives from NGA, CIA, NSA (N=12).  This 
                                                 
68 For the DoD model: the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) was 2.9; visual inspection of kdensity 
and pnorm graphs indicate no systemic pattern in the residuals; using the Breusch-Pagan test to check for 
the homogeneity of variance of the residuals results in a p-value of 0.25, using the Ramsey retest to check 
on model specificity results in a p-value of 0.59 thus confirming the model does not appear to have omitted 
variables.  See Appendix A for more details. 
69 For the State and Local model: the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) was 4.1; visual inspection 
of kdensity and pnorm graphs indicate no systemic pattern in the residuals; using the Breusch-Pagan test to 
check for the homogeneity of variance of the residuals results in a p-value of 0.227, using the Ramsey 
retest to check on model specificity results in a p-value of  0.023 thus confirming the model does not 




distinction is made to highlight the relatively higher importance placed on these three 
agencies within a fusion cell.  The results are discussed below only for OGA (-) because 
testing of the OGA (+) model revealed significant inconsistencies.70  The variables for 
OGA (-) are not rank ordered like the overall model.  For the OGA(-) model the variables 
are rank ordered as follows: decision-making process, leadership, and empowerment.  
Access to decision makers and membership are not statistically valid.  
Statistical Analysis.  P-values for both model regressions are within limits 
(relaxed standard of p<.10) for decision-making process and information flow, 
leadership, and empowerment.  Of note, the decision-making process and information 
flow coefficient variable is the highest for all models (1.7).  Possible explanations could 
be that for OGA respondents, getting anything through their bureaucratic structures is 
success (i.e., being cited for having a product or analysis briefed = potential for 
promotion).  Another alternative is that OGA FC members, because of their access to 
unique information, fully understand that for the FC to be successful information sharing 
must occur.  Interview material suggests that several agencies are known for not fully 
sharing information to the detriment of the FC. 
OGA respondents also highlighted leadership as a powerful influence on 
effectiveness.  As the descriptive statistical analysis indicated for leadership, OGA 
respondents react well to a more decentralized, enabling leadership style.  These results 
suggest FC leaders should, when dealing with OGA members, utilize this style if 
possible.  Empowerment is also statistically significant (p<0.10) with a negative 
coefficient of -.75.  That is to say that any increase in empowerment has a powerful 
negative feedback loop on FC effectiveness.  A possible explanation for this result is that, 
                                                 
70 For the OGA(-) model: the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) was 4.2; visual inspection of 
kdensity and pnorm graphs indicate no systemic pattern in the residuals; using the Breusch-Pagan test to 
check for the homogeneity of variance of the residuals results in a p-value of 0.019, using the Ramsey 
retest to check on model specificity results in a p-value of  0.120 thus confirming the model does not 
appear to have omitted variables.  However, OGA(+) had the following results: VIF was 3.27; visual 
inspection of kdensity and pnorm graphs indicate no systemic pattern in the residuals; the Breusch-Pagan 
test resulted in a p-value of 0.26, and the Ramsey retest resulted in a p-value of 0.73.  The results for the 





within their parent organizations, OGA members are not empowered (strict limits and 
rules) and view that model as being successful.  Individual survey question analysis 
indicates that OGA members were generally not empowered by their parent agency while 
serving on FCs.  Thus, a potential explanation for an OGA member is that the FC’s 
success is tied to their input and that input is derived from a model where the analyst is 
not empowered.  
E. INTERVIEW RESPONSES 
We conducted six interviews with 20 individuals who had served on FCs and two 
senior leaders who were “consumers” of FC products, i.e., decision makers.71  The results 
mirrored the survey responses overall, but highlighted several critical factors related to 
FCs that were not included in the survey (politics, measures of effectiveness, training).  
Politics, for the interviewees, meant the interplay between different agencies, consumers, 
and missions.  Critical internal factors mostly focused on one issue in particular: training.  
A common theme among interviewees emerged regarding effectiveness: metrics are 
changed to reflect success.  In terms of overall counter-terrorism efforts, several 
interview subjects stated that without an interagency effort, effective counter-terrorism is 
impossible.  The highlights of these interview themes are presented below.   
1. Politics 
Interviewees spotlighted the importance of one or two specific agencies (CIA and 
NSA), without which, effective counter-terrorism success is believed impossible.  
Interviewees also stressed the importance of parent agency support for all members of the 
FC.  Agency support plays an important role in supplying the FC with quality individuals 
and in providing the FC with reach-back support.  According to interviewees, this effects 
an FC because there is a constant requirement to try and maintain FC buy-in from all 
parent agencies.  Interviewees also mentioned that FC’s that have higher profile missions 
do not have as much difficulty ensuring parent agency support.   
                                                 





Determining measures of effectiveness is problematic as it relates to FCs.  
Interviewees alleged that FC effectiveness metrics can be and are changed in order to 
make some FCs look better (i.e., lowering standards and/or changing targets).  
Interviewees also discussed how FCs, over time, can shift away from their original 
mission due to a variety of reasons (new requirements, changing leadership, emerging 
trends).  The issue, as it relates to effectiveness, is that these changes do not result in a 
similar change in the FC’s resource base.  The FC is then not resourced properly and 
performance suffers due to this mission creep.  At the individual level, interviewees 
stated that personality conflicts and individual agency (and by extension that agency’s 
representative on the FC) information sharing problems contributed to FC 
ineffectiveness.  
3. Training 
Interviews highlighted training problems, at the analyst and leadership level, as a 
significant limiting factor on an FC’s ability to accomplish its mission.  The problem is 
knowledge of both your own agency’s capabilities and the capabilities of all other 
agencies on the FC.  Specifically for FC leadership, it involves knowing who the right 
person is to answer your question and the right question (as it pertains to that specific 
agency) to ask.  Additionally, if an agency sends a junior or inexperienced analyst, then 
their limited knowledge of their own agency’s abilities and products limits the FC.  
Interviewees stressed that having this knowledge prior to serving on an FC obviates the 
need for the FC to spend significant time and resources devoted to internal training 
requirements.   
F. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
Defining and measuring effectiveness for FCs is problematic for several reasons.  
Survey results and interviews both indicate that most FCs self-define effectiveness, and 
by extension their measurement of it, differently.  As will be shown below, the numerous 




emerge from this analysis, not having anything close to a standard means to capture FC 
effectiveness leads to a tautological problem; just producing x number of reports a day 
does not necessarily equate to effectiveness.   
We expected to develop a coherent, common definition of FC effectiveness to 
serve as our dependent variable.  The answers to Q44 (How does your Fusion Cell 
measure success?) and the comments section of the survey revealed no common unit of 
measure.  How can an FC whose members all want to be successful (promotion, medals, 
intrinsic desire) and whose leadership is evaluated in terms of how successful it is, avoid 
the trap of creating a definition or set of conditions that the FC can easily meet or be the 
only entity capable of measuring?  We will discuss this issue below using both survey 
and interview responses. 
1. Survey and Interview Responses 
The following is a partial list of the survey responses we received to the question 
of how do you measure success on your FC:  
• number of target packages updated 
• prevention of terrorist action or case being solved 
• client feedback 
• rapid response to a request for information  
• number of positive outcomes 
• number of intelligence reports created 
• producing daily products on time 
• successfully forecasting trends 
• number of terrorists captured or killed 
• senior leadership (Flag Officer) happiness 
• shared understanding of the enemy situation 
• no significant events occurring 
• perceived value to units supported 




This list demonstrates the range of metrics that FCs use.  Many of these units of 
measurement do not have direct links to effects on terrorists, they only define how well 
internal mechanisms function.  The comments listed below from respondents on the 
subject of effectiveness highlight the measurement challenges. 
A survey respondent provided the following narrative regarding success and how 
his DoD FC in Iraq defined success in terms of “quantifiable improvement in the efficient 
delivery of services, economic progress, and notable changes in behavior (lethal and non-
lethal).”  His narrative demonstrates the difficulty involved in determining effectiveness 
for FCs; how can an FC measure success in terms that clearly do not have a direct 
relationship with an FC (e.g., economic progress)?  Yet, at the same time few would 
argue that this FC was not effective. 
This FC’s area in Iraq began to see an increase in female suicide bombers.  The 
FC researched the issue and determined the women were widows and/or marginalized in 
their communities.  The FC then worked with the supported command, local authorities 
and third-country partners to develop a government funded project designed to develop 
alternatives for these women (employment training programs, etc.).  The FC then helped 
to design an information campaign to publicize the program and interfaced with other 
U.S. agencies to facilitate construction of a community building and further funding of 
the program.   
The results in this case were that local Imams convinced around 15 women 
destined to be suicide bombers to accept reconciliation.  In one case, a 15 year-old 
woman turned herself in while wearing a suicide vest.  Because of this program, over 200 
jobs were created and social services for disadvantaged women were provided for a 
community.  According to the respondent, the net results also included increased local 
governmental capacity, decreased suicide attacks, increased community usage of 
community services, and an increase in targets captured and/or killed.  Without an in 
depth case study to help determine causality, the exact role of the FC in achieving these 




powerful effect FCs can have in bringing together an inter-agency intelligence fusion and 
the inherent difficulty in precisely measuring FC effectiveness. 
2. Survey Results   
The survey asked respondents to quantify, in terms of a percentage, how many of 
their FC products led to an action (i.e., capture/kill, arrest).  The responses to this 
question further reinforce our findings concerning the difficulty in measuring FC 
effectiveness and provide an interesting perspective on FCs.  Analysis of these responses 
revealed the following breakdown and categorization for 82 responses (55% DoD, 35% 
State and Local, 10% OGA) 
 
What percentage of your FC’s products led to effects (capture/kill mission, arrest)? 
Response Total % of Total 
None/Unknown 21 25 
1-20% 24 29 
21% and higher 37 45 
Sample Size= 82 
Table 8. FC Products and Action from Appendix B 
We analyzed the comments from respondents who answered none/unknown and 
evaluated how they differed from the comments from the other two categories.  We found 
that the first category includes respondents who characterized their response in terms of 
failure or as having measurement problems.  They indicated their FC’s did not have the 
means to measure their own effectiveness.  Table 8 shows that almost half of all 
respondents believed that every fifth product (or higher) produced by their FC resulted in 
an effect.   
These numbers suggest that these FCs are keeping many military and law 
enforcement units busy.  Nevertheless, several respondents highlighted some inherent 




pointed out how difficult it is to determine to what degree a specific FC action or product 
has in the execution of a mission or operation.  The respondent stated:  
This is a tainted question, products do not lead to effects. It is through a 
streamlined process of identifying actionable intelligence, informing 
decision makers, and getting action agents postured to successfully 
kill/capture/arrest. This is the difference between production centric 
intelligence and understanding operational intelligence / processes. 
This criticism is not new in the intelligence field and points out the difficulty involved in 
applying metrics to measure the effectiveness of intelligence products.  The final chapter 
will include several recommendations on how to overcome this problem in FCs.   
The survey also asked respondents to evaluate the effectiveness of their FC using 
a 6-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 6=strongly agree).  As the previous 
discussion has highlighted, “effective” is a difficult term to define and measure.  This 
survey question instead sought to determine how the respondents self identified 
effectiveness on their FCs.  This question subsequently became our proxy dependent 
variable with a mean of 4.49 and standard deviation of 1.36.  
This result may seem to contrast with the question concerning what percentage of 
products lead to effects in Table 6 above.  One quarter of all respondents for that question 
stated that the work their FC did either produced no effect at all or they did not have the 
means to measure their effects.  The parallel finding in the effectiveness rating is that 
20% of all respondents answered this question negatively (disagreed).   
This survey question also asked for comments on the overall rating of FC 
effectiveness.  One particular respondent provided a response that highlights the upside to 
FCs when they are effective: 
The fusion cell, when staffed with the appropriate members and given 
enough time to form a team, is one of the unique environments where 
organizational parochialism dissipates. Moreover, the fusion cell's mix of 
professionals allows for different approaches and perspectives to address a 
problem. These individuals highlight previously unknown avenues for 





In their comments on this question, several respondents also highlighted some potential 
pitfalls in measuring FC effectiveness: 
the XXX had little ability to husband resources in support of the mission, 
and no way to hold national agencies accountable for failure to support. 
As a result, collections were haphazard, and actionable targeting data 
exceedingly scarce. Some of the XXX's accidental successes, however, 
would not have occurred except for the fact that analysts had no other 
option but to rely on their creativity, unconventional sources and processes 
in order to accomplish the mission. Few analysts at the XXX had the 
personal motivation to work that hard, but those that did were successful 
despite the XXX, not because of it. 
The above comments from respondents provide two contrasting descriptions of 
effectiveness and point out the importance of the process, or luck as the above respondent 
would say, as it relates to the ends. 
G. RESULTS SUMMARY 
Survey respondents confirmed the importance of, with some variation, the five 
independent variables.  All of the independent variables for the overall model were 
statistically significant (p<.05).  However, for the sub-models not every variable was 
statistically significant.  The below list (in rank order) summarizes the findings, both 
from descriptive and regression analysis, for each variable: 
3. Access to Decision Makers 
Access is the most important variable bearing on FC effectiveness.  It was also the 
most influential variable by for DoD respondents.  92% of FC respondents believe their 
products influence decision makers.  However, only 60% of respondents reported that 
their FC’s receive feedback from decision makers and decision makers only about one-
third of respondents reported that decision makers visited their FC.  These results suggest 
a gap between how the FC producers and consumers view their relationship.  FC leaders 




4. Decision Making and Information Flow   
Although FC internal processes promote efficient work practices; information is 
not always shared with all FC members.  For instance, 83% of respondents believed their 
FC had open and complete information sharing, yet an average of 60% of FC members 
stated that other members could not or would not share information.  Preliminary data for 
OGA and regression analysis indicates this is an important variable for effectiveness. 
5. FC Membership  
Interagency representation is a must but there are quality and/or training issues 
with personnel from some agencies.  Close to 40% of respondents believed either they 
themselves or other members were not appropriately trained prior to their FC service.  
Interviews indicated the importance of fusing interagency efforts.  These findings suggest 
that FCs should encourage more pre-deployment training and improve the selection 
process.  
6. Leadership  
FC members believe they have quality leadership on their FC and that overall it 
has a small positive impact on effectiveness.  However, preliminary OGA data suggest 
that interagency leadership skills do strongly impact effectiveness.  The ability of an FC 
leader to brief product to decision makers is important. 
7. Empowerment 
This variable had the weakest impact on FC effectiveness and had negative 
coefficients for OGA.  Although there are issues of support and guidance between FCs 
and member’s parent organization; this variable had a minimal positive impact on FC 
effectiveness. 
Attempting to compare the relationship between these five variables and FC 
effectiveness revealed several problematic issues for FCs.  Survey results indicate a 
significant number of FCs have measures of effectiveness that are so subjective as to 




are nonexistent.  Interviews with former and current FC members suggested that 
measures of effectiveness are also open to manipulation (“moving the goalposts” in order 
to demonstrate success).  Interviews also indicated that parent organization support is 
critical, support from the CIA and NSA equates to FC success or failure, and FC 
members and leadership need to understand each other’s capabilities.   Most importantly, 
we believe these results provide us with the necessary information to make policy and 








VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This project began with the intent of exploring ways in which the interagency 
coordination process could be improved in order to better facilitate global counter-
terrorism efforts.  To accomplish this, our team studied interagency fusion cells in great 
detail through the survey and interview process described in previous chapters. The most 
significant variables related to FC effectiveness are access to decision makers and 
decision-making process/information flow.  All of the independent variables for the 
overall model were significantly (p < 0.05) related to the dependent variable of FC 
effectiveness.  However, for each of the sub-group samples, not every independent 
variable was statistically significant (>0.05).  An additional finding from our research is 
that currently there is no standard, commonly excepted definition for FC effectiveness 
(our dependent variable).  It is our belief that we have gathered and analyzed sufficient 
empirical data to offer prescriptive recommendations on two levels:  
1. Micro-policy recommendations: These are the core takeaways from our research, 
recommendations that can quickly improve the effectiveness of a given fusion 
cell. This section will offer suggestions on three levels:   
a. External leadership: Best practices for utilizing a fusion cell 
b. Fusion cell leadership: Best practices for leading an effective fusion cell 
c. Fusion cell membership: How to be an effective part of a fusion cell 
2. Macro-policy recommendations: Drawing from the interagency-relationship data 
seen in the detailed study of fusion cells, this section offers suggestions for more 






B. MICRO-POLICY DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
These recommendations are intended to be practical and implementable in order 
to see swift improvements in the performance of today’s fusion cells.  For precise data on 
why and which variables are seen as more or less important, refer to Chapter V and the 
data appendix. 
Outside Leadership: These suggestions are targeted at senior leadership to whom a given 
fusion cell is offering analysis. 
1. Make Yourself Accessible 
a. Discussion 
 As shown in Chapter V, “access to leadership” proved to be the most 
strongly correlated IV for most organizations.  Fusion cell members put the greatest 
importance on a need to know that the data they produce is reaching key decision makers.  
This was seen most strongly in Department of Defense members and we hypothesized 
that this was due to the hierarchical nature of the military system, making seasoned 
military professionals wary of how slowly the military bureaucracy can move.  Effective 
fusion cells give members the unique opportunity to sidestep those layers with mission-
critical information when they have direct access to the leadership they support.   
b. Recommendation 
 As an outside leader whose unit is being supported by a fusion cell (to 
which, in optimal circumstances, you have contributed talented personnel), you must 
make the FC a priority by maintaining open lines of communication with the FC’s 
leadership.  It is not enough to see the FC as simply another element for intelligence 
analysis and wait for their reports to trickle up through the system.  The FC is frequently 
pulling together information from multiple elements in order to coordinate actions and 
recommend operations that no single unit would be capable of executing without the 
synchronization efforts of the FC.  Or, for those FCs that don’t supply complete analysis 
(such as the JTTFs or state and local FCs), they are still synchronizing the views of 




organizations they support.  Many FCs are real-time-oriented elements; rapid and direct 
access to leadership is the only way to maximize what it is they offer – synchronized but 
often time-sensitive operational choices and recommendations. 
2. Define Success—What do You Expect the Fusion Cell to Provide? 
a. Discussion  
 A struggle throughout this research has been defining what effectiveness is 
for a fusion cell.  Ultimately, as discussed in Chapter V, our research team utilized a 
proxy DV drawn from our survey questions.  The question asked “is your fusion cell 
effective?”  We found strong correlation between the answers to this question and the 
respondents’ answers to our other IVs.  We also pulled a large amount of information 
from the open-ended questions of our survey and from interviews by asking people how 
they defined success in their fusion cell.  There was significant disparity in the answers 
we collected.  Some of this can be attributed to the different types of FCs (e.g., CONUS 
versus OCONUS, State and Local versus Iraq or Afghanistan), but even within similarly 
focused fusion cells there was a lack of consistency on a definition of success. 
b. Recommendation 
 Fusion cell members need to know their mission, and this must be driven 
by the leadership of all stakeholders agreeing to and clearly articulating what it is they 
expect from the FC.  An inability for FC members to articulate what “effectiveness” 
looks like suggests a lack of clear mission guidance.  It is critical that outside leadership 
understand what it is they expect of a given FC and clearly relay that mission to the FC 
leadership.  Every member of the FC must know his or her role in supporting the FC’s 
mission.  In return for this guidance, outside leadership can expect that FC members will 





3. Additional Considerations 
a. Quality of Personnel 
 Provide high quality personnel to the FC: if you are not sending your best 
personnel to work in the fusion cell, the FC will not succeed.  Low-quality personnel 
cannot speak on behalf of their organization in a sufficiently timely manner and will 
mismanage the inter-agency relationships therein.  
b. Fusion Fatigue 
Several interviewees also expressed witnessing what is sometimes referred 
to as “fusion fatigue” which takes place when a fusion cell has been in existence for a 
longer period of time and the personnel assigned to that cell decrease in quality as time 
goes on.  Avoid this by continually screening and assigning only high quality personnel 
to fusion cells and rotating personnel to prevent burn out.  Personnel with fusion cell 
experience in high operational tempo environments, such as Iraq or Afghanistan, end 
their rotations with invaluable experience and a unique interagency skill set.  By rotating 
these personnel to lower tempo fusion cells, fusion fatigue may be avoided and the 
individual’s skills in the conducting interagency efforts can still be put to use.  By placing 
experienced fusion cell members in lower-stress FCs, these locations could become the 
ideal setting for placement of junior analysts under the mentorship of senior and 
experienced FC members who are there for a respite from high tempo theaters. 
c. Feedback 
 Provide feedback to the FC when their input leads to action/effects – with 








Fusion Cell Leadership: These suggestions are targeted at FC leaders/directors. 
4. Connect Your FC with Outside Leadership 
a. Discussion  
 Survey responses and interviews suggest that the most important element 
that the leader of a FC brings to the organization is the ability to access outside 
leadership.   
b. Recommendation 
 As a fusion cell leader, you must develop and maintain close relationships 
with decision makers at the unit(s) your FC supports – they must feel constantly 
connected with you and your FC.  You must be comfortable corresponding directly and 
rapidly with these decision makers when necessary, often bypassing layers of 
bureaucracy.  If you are not able to do this, the ability of your FC to influence/create 
action will be diminished.  Your FC members will see your lack of ability to relay 
information to external decision makers as a significant problem. 
5. Understand Interagency Dynamics 
a. Discussion  
 One might think that a seasoned tactical leader, intelligence officer, or law 
enforcement agent would be a strong FC director due to the ability to organize and lead a 
small group of personnel (internal), and an understanding of how their actions contribute 
to efforts on the battlefield or patrol (external).  However, data suggests that the best 
quality a fusion cell leader can bring to the FC’s internal efforts is an understanding and 
appreciation of what all interagency partners bring to the fight.  In choosing FC leaders, 
seek out individuals with successful interagency experiences and a demeanor that is 




b. Recommendation   
 Fusion cell leaders must fuse a wide array of interagency perspectives.  Be 
aware that you, as the FC director, will be entering a microcosm of interagency 
dynamics.  You must overcome the biases and norms of your own culture and 
synchronize the efforts of the multiple agencies under your leadership. 
6. Ensure You Have the Right Organizations Represented 
 a. Discussion  
 Having the appropriate organizations represented in the FC was identified 
by many survey respondents and interviewees as important to success.  Key to getting the 
right membership is reaching an agreement with all FC supporting organizations on the 
mission of the FC, the criticality of the mission, and what each supporting organization 
will provide the FC and vice-versa.  Personnel sent to the FC to represent a given 
organization must understand the role of the FC, understand their purpose there, and 
arrive with sufficient training and experience to be an asset upon arrival. 
b. Recommendation 
 FC leadership needs to articulate a clear mission for the FC and get buy-in 
from all participating organizations.  FC leadership must clearly state personnel 
requirements for the FC in terms of training, seniority, experience, and accesses.  Ensure 
organizations contributing personnel to the FC have a good, transparent picture of what 
their personnel are doing in the FC and encourage parent organizations to visit and take 
an active interest in the FC.  FCs should not be used as training tours for junior personnel 
– it is critical that experienced and trained individuals fill FC billets.  FC leadership must 
identify ineffective personnel, and/or gaps that exist in collection/analysis capability due 
to lack of appropriate support from a given agency.  FC leadership must raise these 





7.  Additional Considerations 
a.  Know the Interagency 
The more time you’ve dedicated in your career to understanding the 
capabilities and cultures of the various interagency organizations, the better able you will 
be to lead the FC. 
Fusion Cell Members: These suggestions are targeted at personnel assigned to work in a 
fusion cell. 
 8.  Make Information Sharing the Priority 
a. Discussion 
 The core concept of a fusion cell is to ‘fuse’ information.  This requires 
complete sharing of all intelligence and honest exchange about each organization’s 
perspective/intent on a given issue.  This is the ideal, but we are well aware that it will 
not always be met.  Our research clearly showed that when critical members or 
organizations involved in a fusion cell do not make efforts to share information and 
intent, the effectiveness of the FC can significantly diminish.  It is critical to note that the 
reticence of even a single member of an FC can reduce its effectiveness. 
b. Recommendation 
 Open and honest sharing should be the norm.  There are times when that 
will not be possible.  In such cases, the individual or organization in question should be 
honest about the fact that they cannot share on a given topic.  The worst possible 
combination is to not share information, and conceal the fact that one is not sharing.  
Such deceit can make problems exponentially worse. 
9.  Additional Considerations 
a.  Know Your Role 
 Arrive with an understanding of why your organization wants you in the 




b. Arrive with Knowledge 
 Begin truly representing your agency from day one.  Calling your parent 
organization for clarification or permission on every issue is a liaison function, not a 
fusion cell member function.  This type of behavior will reduce the speed at which a 
fusion cell can synchronize information and recommendations—often a key element 
when solving time critical problems. 
C. MACRO-POLICY: INTERAGENCY REFORM 
As discussed in Chapter III, we see a direct relationship between the dynamics of 
a fusion cell and the entire interagency system.  Therefore, we believe that the data 
collected at the micro-level (fusion cell) holds policy recommendations for macro-level 
interagency reform policy.  The following offers a series of broad policy 
recommendations, the validity of which lies in our analysis of interagency fusion cells. 
We are confident that fusion cells have demonstrated a capacity for harnessing the 
capabilities of multiple agencies and producing an end product that no individual 
organization could have produced without a collaborative effort.  Fusion cells bridge the 
gaps that exist between various units on the battlefield, between the myriad intelligence 
organizations supporting CT efforts in the United States and abroad, between multiple 
state-level law enforcement elements, etc.  A fusion cell is a unique entity with a proven 
track record of finding enemies who are skilled at exploiting the seams between all of 
these organizations.   
Our primary macro-policy recommendation is to mirror the fusion cell capability 
at the national level—to create senior level fusion cells that would bridge the gaps 
between our key national organizations (DoD, Intelligence, Justice, etc.).  These national 
level fusion cells would be populated by senior, experienced, and vetted personnel but 
must remain small and agile, similar to the lower level fusion cells studied herein.  These 
national fusion cells (NFCs) would report directly to a cabinet-level advisor such as the 
National Security Adviser or Director of National Intelligence.  Only this access to key 




would draw in the appropriately talented senior leadership from all contributing agencies.  
NFCs would ultimately create a network of highly talented interagency partners that 
would provide synthesized data to national leadership in a timely manner. 
Based on current security priorities, national fusion cells could be established for 
short or long durations.  In today’s environment, we see a specific purpose for both short 
and long-term NFCs. Long-term NFCs would synchronize interagency efforts on major 
standing security issues (e.g., an AF-PAK NFC, very similar to the Pakistan Afghanistan 
Coordination Cell created by the Joint Staff, with the ability to rapidly move information 
and achieve decision making).  Short-term NFCs would be rapidly created and disbanded 
to address specific operations (e.g., a fleeting hostage rescue operation).  Creation of 
these issue-based fusion cells would be based off requests from a host of sources - 
national leadership, Geographic Combatant Commanders, combat theater commanders, 
or individual national agencies.  National fusion cells would be highly mobile.  Building 
a standard bureaucratic fortress replete with individual offices and cubicles to house these 
elements would be completely self-defeating.  Once assigned to an NFC, members would 
be constantly on the move (within D.C. or around the world).   
 
Areas for Future Study (prioritized): 
1. Interagency legislation: A comprehensive study of what a Goldwater-Nichols Act 
for the interagency would look like.  This study would cover career progression 
and the creation of a National Fusion Center. 
2. Interagency training: As a sub-set of interagency legislation, we recommend a 
study on what a career path would look like for DoD and interagency personnel 
once interagency rotations were considered a requirement for advancement.  
Should it apply to all leadership, similar to today’s joint-tours?  Should there be 
an interagency career track that is radically different than any current models? 
3. Internal fusion cell dynamics: A study of best practices inside a fusion cell.  This 
study would include leadership style, physical design, and battle rhythm to name a 





4. Fusion cell mission: A study of the best practices for providing a mission 
statement to fusion cells.  As shown in this study, the concept of “effectiveness” 
varied greatly between FCs, in large part, we argued, because of a lack of clear 
guidance.  What lessons can be learned and passed on from those FCs that truly 
understand their mission? 
5. Sub-group samples: Our findings resulted in discrepancies between the total 
sample and the sub-groups: why do the DoD, State and Local, and OGA sub-
models have regression results with p values >0.10?  A significant contributor to 
this finding may simply lie in the fact that our research is drawn from small 
sample sizes in the sub-groups, but we still believe the finding is worth further 
consideration.  What factors, issues, and/or model traits can possibly explain why 
the overall model results are statistically significant, but that specific sub-model 
results are not?  From our professional experience, in-depth interviews, and 
descriptive statistics in our analysis of this topic we present below possible 
explanations.  Given a lack of further survey data at this time, the speculation 
below can serve as a start point for FC leadership to examine these areas in order 
to better understand the internal dynamics of their own FC.   
a. OGA sample results:  Why are membership and access not statistically 
significant?  Analyzing the survey responses to these variables suggests 
that there is a wide range of responses for OGA respondents to these two 
specific variables.  This could indicate that OGA respondents are either 
more sensitive to these variables or specific agencies within the OGA 
subset view them differently.  In either case, all of the OGA responses 
deserve further study to tease out more nuanced explanations and findings. 
b. DoD sample results:  Why is access to decision makers the only IV to 
achieve statistical significance in relation to FC effectiveness?  This may 
suggest that DoD respondents either take the other variables for granted or 
that access is so important that the other four are inconsequential.  The 
negative coefficient for empowerment is not significant; however, if this 




It could be that some DoD personnel dislike a relatively more free form, 
flowing organizational design than they are familiar with.  This dislike 
would arise from working in an environment foreign to someone familiar 
with an environment in which rank, duty, and occupational specialties 
define the proscribed boundaries.  Another possible explanation could be 
that FC members become “part of the team” and identify with the FC vice 
their parent organization.  Thus, they do not feel it is important to be 
empowered by their parent organization while serving on the FC.  
c. State and Local sample results: A possible explanation for why all of the 
independent variables were not significantly related to the dependent 
variable is the wide differentiation present in this data set.  The 72 State 
and Local FCs receive orders and guidance from disparate organizations 
and leadership, are at differing stages of development, and have differing 
methodologies.  Thus, State and Local respondents may not have as much 
in common with their cohort as DoD or OGA.  This is an important 
question requiring additional research. 
What then is occurring on State and Local FCs?  We believe there may be 
several unique characteristics of State and Local FCs that could emerge in future 
research.  First, decision-making process and information flow came the closest to 
being statistically significant (p = 0.12).  State and Local FCs have had and 
continue to have difficulties communicating between themselves and with DHS or 
DoD computer systems.  Thus, State and Local respondents would most likely 
place a premium on information sharing.  State and Local FCs also generally have 
few barriers between themselves and decision makers; they answer to a governor, 
mayor, or to a judge for a legal action.  Access, for State and Local FCs, may be 
more straightforward than for the larger, more bureaucratized DoD and OGA.  
State and Local FCs have, in most cases, all received or expect to receive 
assistance from DHS (personnel or technical).  Thus, we would expect the 
importance of having the right membership to be related to effectiveness.  Our 




study, as our sample size was not large enough to provide definitive results: (1) 
FC leaders are usually appointed, sometimes political appointees, with little 
experience and (2) a leadership training deficit among State and Local law 
enforcement. 
D.  CONCLUSION 
As clearly shown throughout this study, the focused analysis of fusion cell 
effectiveness is in its infancy.  What today’s problem sets have consistently shown is the 
need for a new paradigm.  The models and institutions put in place at the end of World 
War II served an invaluable purpose, and still have many great capabilities that can be 
brought to bear against today’s threats.  The problem that we are just beginning to 
understand, however, is how to effectively synchronize the best capabilities of these 
national organizations against an enemy who exists outside of the nation-state system.  
We believe that interagency fusion cells are a micro example of how this can be done. 
The fusion cells in this study are, in simplest terms, hubs in an interagency 
network.  When properly manned, resourced, and utilized they tie together the best 
insights and capabilities of the major national level organizations.  The extremist enemies 
facing the United States today are also a network.  They are a network of non-state actors 
tied together by a radical and violent anti-Western, anti-modernization agenda.  Put quite 
simply, we would offer the now oft heard refrain that ‘it takes a network to defeat a 
network.’ Though still small and evolving, fusion cells are the best example in today’s 





APPENDIX A.  STATISTICAL ANALYSIS  
A. REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
As mentioned in Chapter V, we first analyzed the data to designate a proxy 
dependent variable.  We chose four questions from the survey that potentially offered the 
best representation for Fusion Cell (FC) effectiveness.  Those results are below.  As the 
analysis demonstrates, question 46 offers the best statistical match for a proxy dependent 
variable (DV4).  The source for all of the regression analysis is StataCorp. 2007, Stata 
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Figure 4.   DV2 Regression 
 
Figure 5.   DV3 Regression 
 
       _cons    -1.342649   .4532145    -2.96   0.004    -2.242393   -.4429041
         iv5     .0971003   .1521514     0.64   0.525    -.2049585     .399159
         iv4     .4756956   .1367503     3.48   0.001     .2042119    .7471793
         iv3     .0698606   .1136445     0.61   0.540    -.1557522    .2954734
         iv2     .1830965   .1166179     1.57   0.120    -.0484193    .4146123
         iv1     .5170667    .117363     4.41   0.000     .2840717    .7500617
                                                                              
       dv446        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    187.247525   100  1.87247525           Root MSE      =  .79946
                                                       Adj R-squared = 0.6587
    Residual    60.7182344    95   .63913931           R-squared     =  0.6757
       Model     126.52929     5  25.3058581           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,    95) =   39.59
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    101
. regress dv446 iv1 iv2 iv3 iv4 iv5
 





B. REGRESSION TESTS 
We used a variety of tests in order to determine the validity of our proxy 
dependent variable regression.  In order to test collinearity we analyzed the mean 
variance inflation factor (VIF).  Our residual analysis involved examining kernel density 
and pnorm graphs for systemic patterns.  We also used the Breusch-Pagan test to check 
for the homogeneity of variance of the residuals.  To test for model specificity and 
omitted variables, we used the Ramsey retest.  All tests confirmed the statistical validity 
of our model.  Presented below are the test results for the overall model, DoD, State and 
Local, and OGA. 
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Figure 18.   Breusch-Pagan Test for Overall Model  
 
 





    Mean VIF        2.91
                                    
         iv3        1.79    0.558745
         iv2        2.17    0.460647
         iv1        3.02    0.331322
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         iv5        4.10    0.243866
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Figure 30.   Probability Norm for DoD Model IV5 
 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.2546
         chi2(1)      =     1.30
         Variables: fitted values of dv446
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
 
Figure 31.   Breusch-Pagan Test for DoD Model 
 
                  Prob > F =      0.5907
                  F(3, 58) =     0.64
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of dv446
 
Figure 32.   Ramsey Test for DoD Model 
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Figure 45.   Ramsey Test for State and Local Model 
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IV5
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = .69
Kernal Density OGA IV5
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         Prob > chi2  =   0.0195
         chi2(1)      =     5.46
         Variables: fitted values of dv446
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
 
Figure 57.   Breusch-Pagan Test for OGA Model  
 
                  Prob > F =      0.0231
                  F(3, 12) =     4.59
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of dv446
 
Figure 58.   Ramsey Test for OGA Model 
 
 
C. SUBSET MODEL REGRESSION 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.7267853   .5401978    -1.35   0.183    -1.806978    .3534069
         iv5      .052131   .1890243     0.28   0.784    -.3258465    .4301086
         iv4     .1634596   .1910142     0.86   0.395    -.2184968    .5454161
         iv3    -.1098958   .1369789    -0.80   0.426     -.383802    .1640104
         iv2     .1260945   .1362902     0.93   0.359    -.1464345    .3986236
         iv1     .9079411   .1500555     6.05   0.000     .6078866    1.207996
                                                                              
         dv4        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    120.656716    66  1.82813207           Root MSE      =  .74012
                                                       Adj R-squared = 0.7004
    Residual    33.4143331    61  .547775952           R-squared     =  0.7231
       Model    87.2423833     5  17.4484767           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,    61) =   31.85
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     67
. regress dv4 iv1 iv2 iv3 iv4 iv5
 





                                                                              
       _cons    -1.329789   1.135135    -1.17   0.294    -4.247745    1.588168
         iv5     .7394726   .2669039     2.77   0.039     .0533744    1.425571
         iv4     1.702218   .4015899     4.24   0.008     .6698978    2.734537
         iv3    -.7499105    .331528    -2.26   0.073     -1.60213    .1023093
         iv2    -.1445156   .2210992    -0.65   0.542    -.7128691     .423838
         iv1    -.1992823   .2711303    -0.74   0.495     -.896245    .4976803
                                                                              
       dv446        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    22.5454545    10  2.25454545           Root MSE      =  .43576
                                                       Adj R-squared = 0.9158
    Residual    .949429419     5  .189885884           R-squared     =  0.9579
       Model    21.5960251     5  4.31920503           Prob > F      =  0.0019
                                                       F(  5,     5) =   22.75
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     11
. regress dv446 iv1 iv2 iv3 iv4 iv5
 
Table 10. OGA(-) Model Regression 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.9245017   1.049508    -0.88   0.392    -3.161474    1.312471
         iv5     -.182425   .4312279    -0.42   0.678    -1.101566    .7367155
         iv4     .6065439   .3638872     1.67   0.116    -.1690634    1.382151
         iv3     .0673365   .3840112     0.18   0.863     -.751164    .8858371
         iv2     .3956732   .3363038     1.18   0.258    -.3211414    1.112488
         iv1     .4604487    .394896     1.17   0.262    -.3812523     1.30215
                                                                              
         dv4        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    45.2380952    20  2.26190476           Root MSE      =  .86303
                                                       Adj R-squared = 0.6707
    Residual     11.172407    15  .744827137           R-squared     =  0.7530
       Model    34.0656882     5  6.81313764           Prob > F      =  0.0004
                                                       F(  5,    15) =    9.15
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     21
(note: hascons false)
. regress dv4 iv1 iv2 iv3 iv4 iv5, hascons
 
Table 11. State and Local Model Regression 
D.  FREQUENCY ANALYSIS 
Below is a table containing the frequency of responses, mean, and standard 














APPENDIX B.  SURVEY  
A. DESCRIPTION  
Participants received an email soliciting their participation that contained a 
hyperlink to the survey.  Potential respondents were asked to complete a 39-question 
survey.  On average, it took about 20 minutes to complete the survey. We utilized a 
commercial provider, SurveyMonkey.com, as our proxy for the survey.  We arranged for 
participants to connect to, conduct, and exit the survey via SSL in order to protect both 
their information and identity.  We downloaded all surveys from SurveyMonkey and 
stored the information on NPS computer systems.  The survey itself did not ask for names 
but did ask several questions concerning an individual’s experience and background.   
B. METHOD OF RECRUITMENT 
We researched and found contact information for both CONUS based and 
OCONUS Intelligence Fusion Cells via email lists and personal contacts.  We sent an 
email solicitation to these fusion cells.  We sent out the recruitment emails on the 
SIPRand NIPR networks with directions on how to go to link to the survey.  All 
information gathered for this survey is unclassified (i.e., on the NIPR network).  All 
researchers have the appropriate level of clearance (at least SECRET) to utilize these 
methods. 
C. SURVEY 
Starting with Figure 59 is a copy of the actual survey.  We encourage future 
researchers to contact the authors concerning future FC surveys for assistance and/or 
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